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drk 09/26/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

Although I may be shortsighted, I see no problem with the
employer's voluntary plan.
flawed.

The CA's reasoning on this point seems

It rejected the employer's arguments that the plan was

voluntary because it reasoned that the third option, which offered
tax savings and which was sex based, was itself a fringe benefit or
condition of employment.

Because Title VII prevents any condition

of employment that discriminates on the basis of sex, the third
option was

in~lid.

It seems to me that
1

- 4e;'l" ~ ''M~""...,_~~\'.

benefit.
~

t~ e pensio~'
"

is the fringe

The three options are ways to implement the benefit and

the fact that one of the options offers a tax benefit seems neither
the employer's nor the insurer's fault.
I am not sure, however, that this case merits plenary

--

review.

---------...

It would seem that plenary review would be required only if

the Court wanted to cut back on Manhart, which I am not aware that

there is any desire to do.

to offer the first two.

The effect of the CA's opinion seems

The CA's opinion appears to affect two

interests. It deprives the employees of a tax benefit they would
otherwise enjoy.

Second, it may cause the insurance companies to

~-

lose business since their plans
the tax benefit and the conveni
employer.

.~

~

~·

~~~-

no longer have the

advant ~~

of being made available by the
I

This limited effect does not seem, however, a sufficient

reason for taking the case.

This issue is likely to arise

frequently and I would recommend waiting to grant cert.

There are

three cases, currently before different circuits, that involve the
-""'

application of Manhart to university sponsored pension plans.
Because I believe these cases present a more substantial conflict
between state insurance requirements and Title VII, they might

,......

provide a better vehicle for the Court to consider this question.

~

,

~

~ORRIS, ~ (employees)
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

,,

Timely (w/ ext'n)
~~

A voluntary deferred compensation plan allowed retiring

employees to choose between three forms of payments, including an

,,

annuity

boug~~ independent

insurance companies

~use

~\

sex-based actuarial tables.

-·

The question is whether the employer has

violated Title VII by offering this option.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:
facts.

This case was decided on stipulated

Petr allows employees to enroll in a State Deferred

- -

Compensation Plan.

The Plan, which is voluntary, works in two phases.

During the "accumulation phase," employees may contribute as much of
their pay check as they wish to one of a large variety of investment
options.

The employees pay no tax on the money put into the Plan and

pay no tax on the money earned by the investment until it is
distributed.

This portion of the plan treats both sexes equally and

is not under attack.

QJ2on retir eme l} t, employees enter the "pay-out"
1

-

phase of the Plan and must choose one of three options for the
repayment of their deferred compensation.

They may (1) have it

returned in a lump sum (which they can then use, for instance, to buy
the best annuity they can find), (2) receive a specific sum each month
for a fixed number of months, or (3) receive a life annuity which
petrs buy from an independent insurance company.
companies providing option (3) 1

use~ex-based

The insurance

mortality tables showing

that women as a class live to receive more annuity checks than men as
a class receive.

....
1
As a consequence, men receive t igher monthly annuity

payments than women recieve.

From the point of view of tax deferral,

however, option (3) is the best for both sexes.
~--------~-------·
Claiming that option (3) violates the Fourteenth Amendment and,
under the reasoning of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435

u.s.

702 (1978), Title VII, resp brought an action on

1There is some confusion in the record on this point. Petrs
claim that the parties have stipulated that there are no
insurance companies in Arizona who offer annuities based on
unisex tables. Resp claims that it only stipulated that all
companies designated as funding media by petr, Ariz. Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans, use sex-based
tables.

behalf of herself and other women enrolled in the Plan, seeking to
enjoin petrs from offering a sexed-based annuity, and to require petrs
to augment the annuity checks of those retired women who chose option
(3).

The DC (Cordova) certified the class, rejected petrs' arguments

that Title VII is not violated by a voluntary plan or by a plan
containing nondiscriminatory options, and granted injunctive relief.
In -addition, the DC directed that retired female employees be paid
equal annuity payments to men who accumulated the same deferred
income.

The Fourteenth Amendment claim was rejected, however, on the

ground that resp failed to prove purposeful discrimination.
On appeal, petrs challenged both the finding of a Title VII
violation and the relief ordered.

On the violation point, petrs

reiterated the defenses asserted below, and additionally argued that
the DC's decision unduly interfered with the state's right to regulate
the insurance

business~

that Title VII requires proof of intent, which

is lacking since petrs did not themselves create the sex-based annuity
scheme~

that Manhart is limited to self-insured

employers~

that petrs'

Plan falls within the "open market" exception to Manhart ("Nothing in
our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set
aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each
retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated
contributions could command in the open market," 435 U.S. at

717-18)~

and that petrs are not responsible for the discrimination in the Plan
because the options merely reflect the limits in the marketplace.
affirmed.

CA9

On the regulatory issue, the DC reasoned that since the

decision below dealt only with the ability of the employer to offer
its employees discriminatory fringe benefits, it did not unduly
interfere with the insurance business.
much intent as Manhart

required~

It found that resp showed as

that the existence of an option

within the "open market" exception and the Plan's voluntary nature did
not cure the Title VII violation since women are entitled to the same
benefit options as men; and that Title VII protects against an
employer affirmatively adopting any discriminatory scheme, even if it
is the only one available in the marketplace.

Most significantly, in

reliance on language in Manhart saying that "an employer can[not]
avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to
corporate shells," 435

u.s.

at 718 n.33, CA9 held that Manhart is not

limited to employer-operated pension schemes, but rather applies even
when an employer buys annuities from independent companies.
Petrs' challenges to the award were also rejected.

Noting cases

in CAl and DC's in NY, Cal, Mich, and Or. ordering payments by
"passive abusers," CA9 held that the order directing payment to
retired employees was not an abuse of discretion.

It rejected a Tenth

Amendment challenge on the ground that Title VII was enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus giving Congress the power to intrude on the
functioning of the states.
CONTENTIONS:

Petrs claim that this decision extends Manhart to

ban use of sex-based mortality tables by independent insurance company
despite clear language in that opinion stating that Title VII was not
"intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries,"

u.s.

435

at 717 and swallows the "open market" exception carved out in

Manhart since it prohibits the employer from going to the open market
to buy for the employee the best option available.

The decision

ignores the fact that the Plan was voluntary and that the employer has
no control over the insurance industry's methods of operations.
dealt incorrectly with the issue of intent.

CA9

Furthermore, the relief

granted violates the Tenth Amendment under National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1973).

Resp argues that the case involves a staightforward application
of Manhart and that other courts considering contentions similar to
petrs'

h~

agreed with CA9.

Four amici briefs were also received.

The American Council of

Life Insurance makes it clear why the insurance industry feels that
----------~

this decision will have a tremendous impact on the insurance business.
The Council claims that Manhart had little (or no) effect on the
industry because it involved an unpopula r fringe benefit (employeroperated annuities).

By finding Title

VII ~re b rt ity

when an employer

goes out and buys annuities for its employees, this case addresses a
popular fringe benefit that affects 99% of the pension industry.
Moreover, insurance companies cannot by most states' laws
discriminatorily offer only to employers annuities calculated on
unisex tables.

But if they offered both options to everyone, the

insurance companies would soon be insolvent because women would choose
I

to buy unisex annuities, which give them higher monthly payments for a
lower price, while men would choose annuities based on men-only
mortality tables since that would maximize their benefits.

Without

men signing up for unisex insurance, that option would be unstable
because there would be no men paying in more and receiving less to
subsidize the women who receive more.

To make a long argument short,

this decision will require all insurance companies to use ONLY unisex
tables, which is a result Manhart claimed it was not mandating.
The Academy of Actuaries agrees with the above reasoning.

It

notes that it is possible that Congress intended this result when it
enacted Title VII, but thinks that since the result was not foreseen
by the Manhart Court, cert should be granted to reconsider the Manhart
decision before lower courts blithely require the entire industry to
change its methods of operation.

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners argues that
lower courts' extention of Manhart has lead to the federalization of
the insurance industry, which is a reversal of the long-standing
practice of reserving its regulation to the states.

The Court should

grant cert in order to decide whether this result is desirable.
The State of California and its Teachers' Retirement Association
has filed a brief because it is involved in another case where it is
making the same arguments rejected by CA9 in this case.
~

DISCUSSION:

The Conference should consider this case with Calif.

v. Retired Public Employees' Ass'n, No. 82-262, also on this list.
Both cases demonstrate the problems encountered in applying Manhart.
While none of the parties point to conflicts among the circuits, the
Court may want to examine the insurance industry's claims about the
dire results of the many decisions in this area.
it should be limited

t~e

If cert is granted,

question whether Manhart applies to

employers who purchase insurance from independent companies and
perhaps

~he

question whether there is a defense in the fact that

the marketplace did not offer nondiscriminatory choices.2

The intent

question is well settled (discriminatory impact is all that is

required ~The

contentions based on the voluntary nature of the plan

and the existence of nondiscriminatory options are simply variations
on the familiar "separate but equal" argument.

The Tenth Amendment

issue borders on frivolous.
There is a response and four amicus briefs.
September 20, 1982

Dreyfuss

Op'ns in pet'n

2 I assume that the stipulations are in the record, and that the
Court would request the parties to reproduce them in order to
resolve the factual dispute referred to in note 1.
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Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

The cert memo,
time

by Rives,

case.

supplemented by a

brief memo at the

more time on them before next week.

rely

primarily on

the

---

Meanwhile, this memo

merely records my understanding of the
I

this

I ~Lll - s~end

There must be twenty or more briefs.

purpose,

oy

gives me considerable background

issue.

amicus

.For

this

brief of

Dean

Griswold for the American Counsel of Life Insurance - the
organization that represents the 555 insurance companies
that offer 90-plus percent of the life annuity opitions in
plans such as the one at issue.
General Information
Insurance
specific

companies

actuarial

tables

traditionally

have

in calculating

used

six

benefits.

The

accurate calculation of risks is "essential to maintaining
the financial

integrity of a finite

fund that is subject

to partial liquidation upon the occurrence of events such
as

death

or

disability

individual basis".

P. 4.

that

are

unpredictable

on

an

2.

An individual's "sex, like age, provides an objective
statistical

basis"

for

assessing

these

risks.

It

is

asserted in this amicus brief that the decision of CA9, if
affirmed, would be such a "judically forced break with the
past [that] it will revolutionize the insurance industry."
An interanl study conducted by the amicus "estimates that
a prohibition against using sex specific actuarial tables
could increase the cost of retirement plans by as much as
two billion dollars per year". P.3.
The deferred compensation at issue
Created by the Arizona legislature, it is a voluntary
savings

and

employees
taxation

investment

with
on

an

plan

option

income.

The

that
to

provides

defer

plan

35,000

state

compensation

is

administered

and
by

petitioners, a governing committee established by Arizona
law.

This

Committee

has

private institutions for

authority

to

contract

with

the purpose of establishing tax

deferred compensation and annuity programs.
The plan is offered strictly on an voluntary basis,
and

is

funded

entirely

by

state funds are involved.

employee

contributions.

No

Until retirement, employees are

free to direct that their contributions be invested in a
variety

of

funding

media

approved

by

the

Committee,

3.

including savings accounts, mutual funds, life insurance,
or

During

annuities.

the

"pay-out"

phase

(i.e.,

after

retirement) , the employee may elect to receive his or her
( i) lump

deferred compensation also in a variety of ways:
sum payment,

(ii) a specific amount each month for a fixed

number of months, or (iii) a life annuity.

Petitioner in

this case chose to have her contributions

invested

in a

life annuity in a life insurance company, and accordingly
she

will

have

the

compensation and

option

earnings

of

receiving

accumulated

in any one of the

three ways

mentioned above.
All insurance companies in the plan use sex specific
mortality
the

1 i fe

tables
annuity.

probability
contracts

in calculating periodic payments

of

Because

living

provide

a

longer

that

a

woman has
than

woman

a

shall

a

under

statistically

man,

the

annuity

receive

smaller

monthly payments.
But the actuarial value of the annunity contracts are
identical

for

men

and

women.

The

average

woman

will

----------~--------------

receive more dollars than the average man because of the
interest accruing to the woman over a longer period.

r-----rt-rS"
class,

1 ive

not disPuted
longer

than

in

this

men.

case

Nor

is

that women,
it

disputed

as

a

that

4.

actuarial
more

tables enable

an

insurance company

assessment

accurate

of

an

to make

individual's

a

life

expectancy than otherwise would be possible.
Summary of argument for petitoners (i.e. for reversal).
The question is whether the above plan violates Title
VII.

Although explicit sex classifications generally are

invalid,

Title VII does not set forth a per se rule of

illegality.
racial
sexes

There are no exceptions to the rule against

classifications,
can

be

drawn

justification in
between

a

but

when

distinctions

justified.

the demonstrable

person's

sex

and

criteria are not available.

between

Here,

there

the
is

statistic relationship

longevity.

An

alternative

Nor is this a case based on

any "archaic sterotype about the appropriate role of women
in society".
The

effect

discrimination.

of

CA9's

decision

is

one

of

reverse

If sex specific mortality tables are not

permitted, women - in view of their longer life expectancy
will

result

in

their

similarly situated men."

receiving
Br.

p.

9

greater

u.s.

than

Is this documented

in the record?
Manhart, 435

value

702 is distinguishable

CA

9

said

Manhart".

In

employees
fund

that
that

"Arizona's
case,

the

plan

is

employer

that

were

this

statute

14.84%

requirement

"precludes

components
class".
private

required

to make monthly contributions to a
higher

than

the

required of comparable male employees.
that

unlawful

of

a

violated

treatment

racial,

However,

the

Title

of

Manhart

insurance companies were

contributions

This Court held
VII

sexual

decision

female

retirement

because

individuals

religious,

u

was

involved.

as
or

that

simply

national

narrow.

No

We expressly

limited its holding to a violation of Title VII to "an
employer

-

operated pension

fund".

As the Court noted,

all that was at issue in Manhart was "a requirement [by a
private

employer]

that

men

and

women

make

unequal

contributions to an employer-operated pension fund"

(at p.

717} •

Unlike
companies available
tables.

Manhart,

in

this case

not the employer -

options
An

contributions

a

plan

that

important
are

required

independent

provided as one of their
used

sex-based actuarial

distinction
at

insurance

all".

is

that

Moreover,

"no
if

an

employee elects to participate he or she still may choose

b •

one of the

three options available -

only one of which

involves a life annuity.
Every

insurance company

in

the business of writing

this type of annuity that is doing business in Arizona is
said to use sex-based mortality tables.

(State's br. p.

11) •

Argument by respondents for affirmence
In
have

addition to

been

filed

by

respondents brief,
various

civil

the usual briefs

rights

organizations,

women's organizations AFofL-CIO, etc.
Respondents

rely primarily on Manhart,

as did CA9.

They argue that the employer (the State) exercises nearly
total control of the plan.

The basic argument, however,

is that all women are treated differently from men,
that this

and

is the only showing required under Title VII.

The state here is simply offering a "discriminatory fringe
benefit".
Apart

from

quite thin.
we

view

Manhart,

I

find

respondents

arguments

Our decision in this case will turn upon how

Manhart.

It

certainly

can

be

distinguished,

though one can argue that its logic lends support to an
affirmence

7.

I am interested in Rives' views, as he will have had
more time to look at the large stack of briefs than I have
had to date.

drk 03/26/83

BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

March 26, 1983

.From: Rives

No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

Question Presented

The issue is whether a private employer violates
Title VII by making available to his employees a life annuity,
provided by a private insurer using sex based mortality tables.

I.

Background
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a
I

voluntarv retirement plan that is divided into two stages.
'?"'

In

the first stage, the employees contribute to a general fund.
All the money paid into the plan is invested and, on
contr~buted

retirement, the amount the individual employee has
is calculated.

}--

eJ-~~

The employee is given three options as to how
A

he receives his contributions: i) he may elect to take the
money in a

~ ump

sum; ii) he mav receive a

~ ixeii

period of time; or iii) he may choose to buy a
7

contract.

sum for a fixed

~ fe

annuity

Arizona has selected the companies with which an

employee who desires an annuity may contract.

All of these

companies use sex-based mortality tables to calculate the
monthly amounts due under the annuity.

P~

'?J!~.~-

Arizona's method of setting up its deferred
compensation plan

i~~
rned
-.--

in large part by the federal tax

~
~

1

~:~ry :e::::rf:: ::::r:l:::.t::ea::::::::sc::::i:::i::: ~
remain assests of the State.

The employee is never taxed on

the amount of the contribution that is retained and the State
does not pay tax on any interest that accrues.

When the

employee retires and receives his benefits under the plan, the
amounts received are taxable to the employee.

Thus, as a

general matter, there is a distinct tax advantage to receiving
a stream of payments (the second or third options) rather than
a lump sum payment (the first option).

I~

The CA found that offering this third option violated
Title VII under Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435

u.s.

702 (1978).

There are three ways in which

theCA's holding might be considered:

(i) whether providing men

and women an income stream that is of equal
value at the time
,•
of their retirement violates Title VII;

(ii) whether an

employer who makes available a life annuity plan that is
calcuated using a sex-based table violates Title VII; and (iii)
whether the fact that two optional, non-discriminatory penson
plans are offered cures any defect caused bv offering the sexbased plan.

A.

Whether Men and Women Received a Benefit of Equal Value
The first argument made by petr and amici insurance

companies seems persuasive.

~he

risk that an insurance company

accepts when it writes life annuites results from the inability
to measure how long any one person will live.

But if this risk

is accepted for a group of people, the insurance company can
predict with some reliability the rate and frequency of deaths
within the group based on the past mortality experience of
similar groups.

The accuracy with which an insurance company

predicts the rate of mortality depends on its ability to
identify groups with similar mortality rates, and

~efini~

groups on the basis of sex has proved to be a reliable index of
mortality.

Thus, when an insurance company seeks to determine

the stream of payments that $10,000 will buy for a person aged
65, men have been given higher periodic payments than women

because men, as a group, will have a shorter lifespan.

Women,

because of their longer lifespan, generally receive lower
'

periodic payments for the same amount of money.
The insurance companies argue that in finding that
the women are discriminated against, the CA failed to recognize
what an annuitant receives when he buys a life annuity.

He

buys the right to receive a stream of payments for life.

When

the woman and the man each purchase a $10,000 annuity, the
right that they purchase--the right to receive a stream of
payments--is equal in value at the time of their purchase.
The difficulty with this argument is that it assumes
that sex may be used to define the groups.

~ ~

As valid as the

argument seems, Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
vr Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1979), rejected it:
"[T]he question of fairness to various classes
affected by the statute is essentially a matter of
policy for the legislature to address. Congress has
decided that classifications based on sex, like those
based on national origin or race, are unlawful.
Actuarial studies could unquestionably identify
differences in life expectancy based on race or
national origin, as well as sex. But a statute that
was designed to make race irrelevant in the
employment market .•• could not reasonably be
construed to permit a take-home-pay differential
based on a racial classification . • . . [T]here is no
reason to believe that Congress intended a special
definition of discrimination in the context of
employee group insurance coverage.
It is true that
insurance is concerned with events that are
individually unpredictable, but that is
characteristic of many employment decisions.
Individual risks, like individual performance, may
not be predicted by resort to classifications
proscribed by Title VII." Id., at 709-710.

~

-~
~~!''

~

~ Manhart can be distinguished by the fact that it involved an
I (

employer practice in which women paid a higher contribution

~

\.'

.J •

than men in order to receive the same periodic payment on

--

retirement, whereas in this case the women made equal
contributions but received lower periodic payments.

But it

would seem to make little difference whether women make larger
contributions in order to receive equal period payments or make
equal contributions but receive lower periodic payments.

The

differential in both cases is attributable to the use of sexbased mortality tables.
Although Manhart seems to establish fairly clearly
that a person's sex may not be used to define the group over
which the risk is spread, Manhart leads to several anomalies.
First, Manhart recognized that in establishing the proper
periodic payment for a particular group, an insurer may
"conside[r] the composition of an employer's work force in
determining the probable cost of a retirement or death benefit
plan."

See 435 U.S., at 718 and n. 34.

Thus, if the group

were 90% women and 10% men, the insurer could consider that the
average lifespan of this group would be longer than it would if
the group consisted of 30% women and 70% men.

The monthly

payment for the first group would be lower than it would for
the second.

It seems odd that the insurance companies may not

define the groups by sex but make take the sexual composition
of groups into account in determining the size of monthly
payments.
A related problem arises from "adverse selection."

-

Including men and women in the same group means that men
receive lower payments than they would if insurance

~

companies ~

used sex-based tables.

Because men are required to subsidize

the women included in the group, men may opt not to purchase a
unisex life annuity.

They will either go out in the open

market and purchase a sex-based annuity or will opt to receive
a fixed number of payments for a fixed number of years.

As men

choose not to enter the group, women will compose an increasing
percentage of the group and the group payments accordingly will
be lowered.

B.

Whether Making a Sex-Based Annuity Available Violates Title

VII
In Manhart, the employer
provided the pension plan
__.;;;...._..:;;._ I
and required that its employees join the plan.

The Court

explicitly noted that "[n]o private insurance company is
involved in the administration or payment of benefits."
U.S., at 705.

435

After considering whether Los Angeles plan

violated Title VII, the Court stated:
"Although we conclude that the Department's
practice violated Title VII, we §o n9 t suggest that
the statute was intended to revolu tionize the
ins urance an d pens i on i ndustries. All t h at' is at
i ssue ~ toaay ~ s a regu i remen t €hat men and women make
unequal contributrons to an employer-operated pension
fund." Id., at 717 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court in Manhart contemplated two situations.

It

held that the provision of an employer-operated fund would
violate Title VII if it used sex-based tables.

--

It also held

that Title VII was not intended to require a private insurer to

-

abandon the use of sex-based tables.
middle situation.

This case presents the

Here the employer has gone out into the

I

•

private market, purchased annuities and made them available to
its employees.

There is a substantial

~eason

for its doing so.

If the employees were given a lump sum payment to purchase
annuities independently, they would suffer a substantial tax
loss since the lump sum would be taxed on receipt at a high
rate.

When the employer invests their contributions for them

in a private annuity, the receipt of their contributions is
spread out over a longer period of time and the tax bite is
lessened correspondingly.
It makes little sense to say that the employee can go
out and buy a sex-based annuity in the private market, but the
employer cannot do so to save the employee money.

To prevent

the employer from doing this would undermine the attractiveness
of annuities considerably and result in the "revolution" that
Manhart ostensibly sought to avoid.

There is no indication

that Congress intended to extend the reach of Title VII so far.
Without a clear indication of congessional intent, it could be
argued that the holding in Manhart should not be extended to
the situation in this case.

This holding, however, would limit \

the effectiveness of Manhart substantially.
The resps argue that an employer would not be
prevented from offering annuities.

Rather, it could negotiate

with insurance companies to obtain unisex annuities.

Placing

an affirmative duty on employers to negotiate for group plans
using unisex tables does not seem workable for several reasons.
First, negotiation would be possible only for large employers
whose group plans give them sufficient economic power to

....

·.:··'-:"'

...........
:.

require the insurance industry to change its practices.
}

'

\'-

While
cr--

these large employers might be able to obtain unisex plans,

~ maller employers ' would not be able to do so.

w-k,

If these small

employers were prevented from offering sex-based annuities and
unable to obtain unisex annuities, then their employees would
be prevented from receiving the tax benefits available to other
employees.

Second, if you agree with the argument that the

Court should not require that the insurance industry be
restructured without a clear mandate from Congress, then it
would seem that requiring employers to negotiate to obtain
unisex annuities would achieve the same result.

It would do

indirectly what it is not clear Congress intended to do
directly.

~

C.

Whether the Presence of the Option Renders This Plan
Acceptable
Finally, it could be argued that Title VII only

Tb~1Zli_

prohibits discrimination "against any individual with respect
. '1 eges o f
. compensation,
.
t 0 h 1s
terms, con d't'
1 1ons, or pr1v1
employment."

--

~-;G,-

~/-

The "privilege" that is at issue here is the

right to participate the State's deferred compensation plan.
~
~~----------------~------------------The first two options offered by the State (the lump sum

-

payment and the right to receive a fixed sum for a fixed time)
are concededly non-discriminatory.

The fact that the State

makes a third option available that relies on sex-based
mortality tables does not mean that the privilege offered--the
right to participate in the pension plan--violates Title VII.

~

::1 •

Indeed, if Arizona had offered only the first two options (the
lump sum payment and the fixed payments ,for a fixed period of
time), there would be no suit.

It is hard to see why adding

the third option makes Arizona's deferred compensation scheme
discriminatory.
Resp and the amici advance two reasons why the
inclusion of the third option violates Title VII.

First, they

contend that the options cannot be considered equal since the
third option results in markedly better
the first.

~

consequences than

lL

~

This argument, however, lacks merit because the

second option provides equivalent tax benefits to the employee.
Under this option, an employee may elect to receive a fixed
number of payments for a fixed period of time depending on the
present value of his accrued contributions.

By speading out

the payments that he receives, the employee is able to achieve
tax consequences that are comparable to those of receiving a
life annuity.

The only detriment is that the second option

deprives the employee of the security that an annuity
guarantees.

Although there is some disparity between the

second and third options, the disparity results from conditions
imposed by the tax system and should not be attributed to the
employer.
Second, resp argues that an employer may not offer a
discriminatory choice as an option.

Por example, it may not

say that all employees are entitled to membership in a club and
provide two options; an integrated facility and a segregated
one.

I must say that I find this argument difficult to refute.
-------~---

7

·t...4L .7

Offering such facilities would give the employer's stamp of
approval to a discriminatory practice.

Conclusion
Because of my concern about the third argument, I
would recommend not relying on it.

Similarly, I am concerned

that adopting the first argument offered by the petrs would be
contrary to the central premise of Manhart.

Accordingly, I

would suggest that the opinion be reversed on the second
ground: that without some clearer indication that Congress

-

......

intended to extend Title VII beyond the situation in Manhart,
the Court should not undertake to change the practices in the
insurance industry.

It seems that an undertaking of such

magnitude is best left to Congress.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-52

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DEFERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U. S. 702 (1978), this Court held that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring
women to make larger contributions in order to obtain the
same monthly pension benefits as men. The question presented by this case is whether Title VII also prohibits an employer from offering its employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by
the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly benefits than a man who has made the same contributions.
I
A
Since 1974 the State of Arizona has offered its employees
the opportunity to enroll in a deferred compensation plan administered by the Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans (Governing Committee). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §38-371 et seq.;
Ariz. Regs. 2-9-01 et seq. Employees who participate in the
plan may thereby postpone the receipt of a portion of their
wages until retirement. By doing so, they postpone paying
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federal income tax on the amounts deferred until after retirement, when they receive those amounts and any earnings
thereon.'
After inviting private companies to submit bids outlining
the investment opportunities that they were willing to offer
State employees, the State selected several companies to
participate in its deferred compensation plan. Most of the
companies selected offer three basic retirement options: (1) a
single lump-sum payment upon retirement, (2) periodic payments of a fixed sum for a fixed period of time, and (3)
monthly annuity payments for the remainder of the employee's life. When an employee decides to take part in the deferred compensation plan, he must designate the company in
which he wishes to invest his deferred wages. Employees
must choose one of the companies selected by the State to
participate in the plan; they are not free to invest their deferred compensation in any other way. At the time an employee enrolls in the plan, he may also select one of the payout options offered by the company that he has chosen, but
when he reaches retirement age he is free to switch to one of
the company's other options. If at retirement the employee
decides to receive a lump-sum payment, he may also purchase any of the options then being offered by the other companies participating in the plan. Most employees find an annuity contract to be the most attractive option, since receipt
of a lump sum upon retirement requires payment of taxes on
the entire sum in one year, and the choice of a fixed sum for a
fixed period requires an employee to speculate as to how long
he will live.
Once an employee chooses the company in which he wishes
to invest and decides the amount of compensation to be de'See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 72-25; Rev. Rul. 68-99; Rev. Rul.
60-31. Arizona's deferred compensation program was approved by the Internal Revenue Service in 1974.
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ferred each month, the State is responsible for withholding
the appropriate sums from the employee's wages and channelling those sums to the company designated by the employee. The State bears the cost of making the necessary
payroll deductions and of giving employees time off to attend
group meetings to learn about the plan, but it does not contribute any monies to supplement the employees' deferred
wages.
For an employee who elects to receive a monthly annuity
following retirement, the amount of the employee's monthly
benefits depends upon the amount of compensation that the
employee deferred (and any earnings thereon), the employee's age at retirement, and the employee's sex. All of the
companies selected by the State to participate in the plan use
sex-based mortality tables to calculate monthly retirement
benefits. App. 12. Under these tables a man receives
larger monthly payments than a woman who deferred the
same amount of compensation and retired at the same age,
because the tables classify annuitants on the basis of sex and
women on average live longer than men. 2 Sex is the only
factor that the tables use to classify individuals of the same
age; the tables do not incorporate other factors correlating
with longevity such as smoking habits, alcohol consumption,
weight, medical history, or family history. App. 13.
As of August 18, 1978, 1,675 of the State's approximately
35,000 employees were participating in the deferred compensation plan. Of these 1,675 participating employees, 681
were women, and 572 women had elected some form of future
' Different insurance companies participating in the plan use different
means of classifying individuals on the basis of sex. Several companies
use separate tables for men and women. Another company uses a single
actuarial table based on male mortality rates, but calculates the annuities
to be paid to women by using a six-year "setback," i. e. , by treating a
woman as if she were a man six years younger and had the life expectancy
of a man that age. App. 12.
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annuity option. As of the same date, 10 women participating in the plan had retired, and four of those 10 had chosen a
life-time annuity. App. 6.
B
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie Norris, an employee
in the Arizona Department of Economic Security, elected to
participate in the plan. She requested that her deferred
compensation be invested in the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company's fixed annuity contract. Shortly thereafter
Arizona approved respondent's request and began withholding $199.50 from her salary each month.
On April 25, 1978, after exhausting administrative remedies, respondent brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona against the State, the Governing Committee, and several individual members of the
Committee. Respondent alleged that the defendants were
violating § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), by administering an annuity plan that discriminates on the basis of
sex. Respondent requested that the District Court certify a
class under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) consisting of all female employees of the ·State of Arizona "who are enrolled or
will in the future enroll in the State Deferred Compensation
Plan." Complaint ~ V.
On March 13, 1980, the District Court certified a class action and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff class, 3
holding that the State's plan violates Title VII. 4 486 F.
Supp. 645. The court directed petitioners to cease using
3

The material facts concerning the State's deferred compensation plan
were set forth in a statement of facts agreed to by all parties. App. 4-13.
• Although the District Court concluded that the State's plan violates
Title VII, the court went on to consider and reject respondent's separate
claim that the plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 486 F. Supp., at 651. Because respondent did not cross appeal from this ruling, it was not passed on by the Court of Appeals and is
not before us.
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sex-based actuarial tables and to pay retired female employees benefits equal to those paid to similarly situated men. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 671 F. 2d 330 (1982).
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Arizona plan violates Title VII and whether, if so, the relief ordered by the
District Court was proper. - - U. S. - - (1982).

II
We consider first whether petitioners would have violated
Title VII if they had run the entire deferred compensation
plan themselves, without the participation of any insurance
companies. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment
practice "to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There
is no question that the opportunity to participate in a deferred compensation plan constitutes a "conditio[n] or privileg[e] of employment,'' 6 and that retirement benefits constitute a form of "compensation." 7 The issue we must decide is
whether it is discrimination "because of . . . sex" to pay a retired woman lower monthly benefits than a man who deferred the same amount of compensation.
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U. S. 702 (1978), we held that an employer had violated Title
VII by requiring its female employees to make larger con• The court subsequently denied respondent's motion to amend the judgment to include an award of retroactive benefits to retired female employees as compensation for the benefits they had lost because the annuity
benefits previously paid them had been calculated on the basis of sex-segregated actuarial tables. Respondent did not appeal this ruling.
6
See Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R . Co., 483 F . 2d 490, 492, n. 3 (CA5),
cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1002 (1973).
7
See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702,
712, n. 23 (1978).
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tributions to a pension fund than male employees in order to
obtain the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Noting
that Title VII's "focus on the individual is unambiguous," id.,
at 708, we emphasized that the statute prohibits an employer
from treating some employees less favorably than others because of their race, religion, sex, or national origin. !d., at
70~709. While women as a class live longer than men, id.,
at 704, we rejected the argument that the exaction of greater
contributions from women was based on a "factor other than
sex"-i. e., longevity-and was therefore permissible under
the Equal Pay Act: 8
"[A]ny individual's life expectancy is based on a number
of factors, of which sex is only one .... [O]ne cannot 'say
that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is
"based on any other factor than sex." Sex is exactly
Section 703(h} of Title VII, the so-called Bennett Amendment, provides that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from "differentiat[ing]
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation
is authorized by [the Equal Pay Act]." 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2(h).
The Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), provides in pertinent part:
"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
:r:esponsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex:
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 77 Stat. 56, 29
u. s. c. § 206(d).
8
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what it is based on.'" 435 U. S., at 712-713, quoting
553 F. 2d 581, 588 (CA9 1976), and the Equal Pay Act.
We concluded that a plan requiring women to make greater
contributions than men discriminates "because of . . . sex"
for the simple reason that it treats each woman "'in a manner
which but for [her] sex would [have been] different."' 435
U. S., at 710, quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971).
We have no hesitation in holding, as have all but one of the
lower courts that have considered the question, 9 that the
classification of employees on the basis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the
pay-in stage. 10 We reject petitioners' contention that the Ar9
See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F. 2d 1054 (CA2
1982), cert. pending, No. 82-791; Retired Public Employees' Assn. of California v. California, 677 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-262;
Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, '515 F. Supp. 295
(SDNY 1981); Hannahs v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System,
26 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 527 (SDNY 1981); Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement system, 27 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas. 1306 (CD Cal. 1981), appeal
docketed, Nos. 81-5865, 81-5866 (CA9 1981); Shaw v. Internat'l Assn. of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 24 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas 995 (CD Cal.
1980). See also EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F. 2d 1139 (CA11978).
Only the Sixth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Peters v.
Wayne State University, 691 F. 2d 235 (1981), cert. pending, No. 82-794.
10
It is irrelevant that females employees in Manhart were required to
participate in the pension plan, whereas participation in the Arizona deferred compensation plan is voluntary. Title VII forbids all discrimination
concerning "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," not just discrimination concerning those aspects of the employment
relationship as to which the employee has no choice. It is likewise irrelevant that the Arizona plan includes two options-the lump-sum option and
the fixed-sum-for-a-fixed-period option-that are provided on equal terms
to men and women. An employer that offers one fringe benefit on a discriminatory basis cannot escape liability because he also offers other benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis. Cf. Mississippi University for Women

82-52-0PINION
8

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMI'ITEE v. NORRIS

izona plan does not discriminate on the basis of sex because a
woman and a man who defer the same amount of compensation will obtain upon retirement annuity policies having approximately the same present actuarial value. 11 Arizona has
simply offered its employees a choice among different benefit
levels, any one of which, if offered alone, would be equivalent
to the plan at issue in Manhart, where the employer determined both the monthly contributions employees were required to make and the level of benefits that they were paid.
If a woman participating in the Arizona plan wishes to obtain
monthly benefits equal to those obtained by a man, she must
make greater monthly contributions than he, just as the female employees in Manhart had to make greater contributions to obtain equal benefits. For any particular level of
benefits that a woman might wish to receive, she will have to
make greater monthly contributions to obtain that level a
benefits than a man would have to make. The fact that Arizona has offered a range of discriminatory benefit levels,
rather than only one such level, obviously provides no basis
whatsoever for distinguishing Manhart.
In asserting that the Arizona plan is nondiscriminatory because a man and a woman who have made equal contributions
will obtain annuity policies of roughly equal present actuarial
value, petitioners incorrectly assume that Title VII permits
an employer to classify employees on the basis of sex in predicting their longevity. Otherwise there would be no basis
v. Hogan,- U . S . - , - , n. 8 (1982).
11
The present actuarial value of an annuity policy is determined by multiplying the present value (in this case, the value at the time of the employee's retirement) of each monthly payment promised by the probability,
which is supplied by an actuarial table, that the annuitant will live to receive that payment. An annuity policy issued to a retired female employee under a sex-based retirement plan will have roughly the same
present actuarial value as a policy issued to a similarly situated man, since
the lower value of each monthly payment she is promised is offset by the
likelihood that she will live longer and therefore receive more payments.
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for postulating that a woman's annuity policy has the same
present actuarial value as the policy of a similarly situated
man even though her policy provides lower monthly benefits. 12 This underlying assumption-that sex may properly
be used to predict longevity-is flatly inconsistent with the
basic teaching of Manhart: that Title VII requires employers
to treat their employees as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." 435
U. S., at 708. Manhart squarely rejected the notion that,
because women as a class live longer than men, an employer
may adopt a retirement plan that treats every individual
woman less favorably than every individual man. I d., at
71&-717.
As we observed in Manhart, "[a]ctuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based on
race or national origin, as well as sex." I d., at 709 (footnote
omitted). If petitioners' interpretation of the statute were
correct, such studies could be used as a justification for paying employees of one race lower monthly benefits than employees of another race. We continue to believe that "a statute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the
employment market," ibid., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U. S. 424, 436 (1971), could not reasonably be construed
to permit such a racial classification. And if it would be unlawful to use race-based actuarial tables, it must also be unlawful to use sex-based tables, for under Title VII a distinction based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinction
based on race unless it falls within one of a few narrow exceptions that are plainly inapplicable here. 13
See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., supra, 691 F. 2d, at
1061-1062; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimiation in
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512-514 (1980).
18
The exception for bona fide occupational qualifications, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2(e), is inapplicable since the terms of a retirement plan have nothing to do with occupational qualifications. The only possible relevant ex12

82-52--0PINION
10

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMIITEE v. NORRIS

What we said in Manhart bears repeating: "Congress has
decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on
national origin or race, are unlawful." 435 U. S., at 709.
The use of of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate retirement benefits violates Title VII whether or not the tables
reflect an accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a
class, for under the statute "[e]ven a true generalization
about [a] class" cannot justify class-based treatment. 14 Ibid.
ception recognized in the Bennett Amendment, see n. 8, supra, is inapplicable in this case for the same reason it was inapplicable in Manhart: a
scheme that uses sex to predict longevity is based on sex; it is not based on
"any other factor than sex." See 435 U. S., at 712 ("any individual's life
expectancy is based on any number of factors , of which sex is only one").
14
In his separate opinion in Manhart, JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed
doubt that that decision could be reconciled with this Court's previous decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert a
divided Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability benefit plan did not constitute discrimination "because of ... sex"
within the meaning of Title VII. The majority reasoned that the special
treatment of pregnancy distinguished not between men and women, but
between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons of both sexes. Id., at
135. The dissenters in Gilbert asserted that "it offends common sense to
suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex related,'" id., at 149 (BRENNAN, J. , dissenting) (citation omitted), and that the special treatment of pregnancy constitutes sex
discrimination because "it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male." !d., at 162 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
The tension in our cases that JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in Manhart has
since been eliminated by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978 (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, in which Congress
overruled Gilbert by amending Title VII to establish that "the terms
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ... because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. IV). See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC , U. S. (1983).
The enactment of the PDA buttresses our holding in Manhart that the
greater cost of providing retirement benefits for women as a class cannot
justify differential treatment based on sex. 435 U. S., at 716-717. Jus-
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An individual woman may not be paid lower monthly benefits
simply because women as a class live longer than men. 15 Cf.
Connecticut v. Teal, - - U. S. - - (1982) (an individual
may object that an employment test used in making promotion decisions has a discriminatory impact even if the class of
which he is a member has not been disproportionately denied
promotion).
We conclude that it is just as much discrimination "because
of . . . sex" to pay a woman lower benefits when she has
made the same contributions as a man as it is to make her pay
larger contributions to obtain the same benefits.

III
Although petitioners plainly would have violated Title VII
if they had run the entire deferred compensation plan themselves, we must decide whether their conduct is beyond the
TICE REHNQUIST's opinion for the Court in Gilbert relied heavily on the absence of proof that the employer's disability program provided less coverage for women as a class than for men. 429 U. S., at 138-139. In
enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that requiring employers to cover
pregnancy on the same terms as other disabilities would add approximately
$200 million to their total costs, but concluded that the PDA was necessary
"to clarify [the] original intent" of Title VII. H. R. Rep. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1978). Since the purpose of the PDA was simply to
make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII principles, see Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,-U. S., at - - , and n. 16, Congress' decision to forbid special treament of
pregnancy despite the special costs associated therewith provides further
support for our conclusion in Manhart that the greater costs of providing
retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a
sex-based retirement plan. Cf. id., at--, n. 24. See also 29 CFR
§ 1604.9(e) (1982) ("It shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of
sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with
respect to one sex than the other").
16
As we noted in Manhart, "insurance is concerned with events that are
individually unpredictable, but that is characteristic of many employment
decisions" and has never been deemed a justification for "resort to the
classifications proscribed by Title VII." 435 U. S., at 710.
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reach of the statute because it is the companies chosen by petitioners to participate in the plan that calculate and pay the
retirement benefits.
Title VII "primarily govern[s] relations between employees and their employer, not between employees and third
parties." 16 Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718, n. 33. Recognizing
this limitation on the reach of the statute, we noted in
Manhart that
"Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful
for an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the
largest benefits which his or her accumulated contributions could command in the open market." I d., at
717-718 (footnote omitted).
Relying on this caveat, petitioners contend that they have
not violated Title VII because the life annuities offered by
the companies participating in the Arizona plan reflect what
is available in the open market. Petitioners cite a statement
in the stipulation of facts entered into in the District Court
that "[a]ll tables presently in use provide a larger sum to a
male than to a female of equal age, account value and any
guaranteed payment period." App. 10. 17
It is no defense that all annuities available in the open market may have been based on sex-segregated actuarial tables.
16

The statute applies to employers and "any agent" of an employer. 42
U. S. C. § 2000e(b).
17
Although petitioners also emphasize that an employee participating in
the Arizona plan can elect to receive a lump-sum payment upon retirement
and then "purchase the largest benefits which his or her accumulated contributions could command in the open market," the fact that the lump-sum
option permits this has no bearing on whether petitioners have discriminated because of sex in offering an annuity option to its employees. As we
have pointed out above, ante, at note 10, it is no defense to discrimination
in the provision of a fringe benefit that another fringe benefit is provided
on a nondiscriminatory basis.
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In context it is reasonably clear that the stipulation on which
petitioners rely means only that all the tables used by the
companies taking part in the Arizona plan are based on sex, 18
but our conclusion does not depend upon whether petitioner's
construction of the stipulation is accepted or rejected. It is
irrelevant whether any other insurers offered annuities on a
sex-neutral basis, since the State did not simply set aside retirement contributions and let employees purchase annuities
on the open market. On the contrary, the State provided
the opportunity to obtain an annuity as part of its own deferred compensation plan. It invited insurance companies to
submit bids outlining the terms on which they would supply
retirement benefits 19 and selected the companies that were
permitted to participate in the plan. Once the State selected
these companies, it entered into contracts with them governing the terms on which benefits were to be provided to employees. Employees enrolling in the plan could obtain retirement benefits only from one of those companies, and no
employee could be contacted by a company except as permitted by the State. Ariz. Regs. 2-9-06.A, 2-9-20.A.
Under these circumstances there can be no serious question that petitioners are legally responsible for the discriminatory terms on which annuities are offered by the companies
chosen to participate in the plan. Having created a plan
whereby employees can obtain the advantages of using deferred compensation to purchase an annuity only if they invest in one of the companies specifically selected by the
State, the State cannot disclaim responsibility for the discriminatory features of the insurers' options. 20 Since em18

This is the natural reading of the statement, since it appears in the
portion of the stipulation discussing the options offered by the companies
participating in the State's plan.
19
The State's contract procurement documents asked the bidders to
quote annuity rates for men and women.
00
See Peters v. Wayne State University, supra, 691 F . 2d, at 238; EEOC
v. Colby College, supra, at 1141; Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or
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ployers are ultimately responsible for the "compensation,
terms, conditions, [and] privileges of employment" provided
to employees, an employer that adopts a fringe-benefit
scheme that discriminates among its employees on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII regardless of whether third parties are also involved in the discrimination. 21 In this case the State of Arizona was itself a
party to contracts concerning the annuities to be offered by
the insurance companies, and it is well established that both
parties to a discriminatory contract are liable for any discriminatory provisions the contract contains, regardless of
Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the
Manhart Case, 64 AAUP Bulletin 150, 152-155 (1978).
21
An analogy may usefully be drawn to our decision in Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB, 441 U. S. 488 (1979). The employer in that case provided in-plant
food services to its employees under a contract with an independent caterer. We held that the prices charged for the food constituted "terms
and conditions of employment" under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and were therefore mandatory subjects for collective bargaining.
We specifically rejected the employer's argument that, because the food
was provided by a third party, the prices did not implicate " 'an aspect of
the relationship between the employer and employees."' Id., at 501,
quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U. S. 157, 176 (1971). We emphasized that the selection of an independent contractor to provide the food did not change the fact that "the
matter of in-plant food prices and services is an aspect of the relationship
between Ford and its own employees." 441 U. S., at 501.
Just as the issue in Ford was whether the employer had refused to bargain with respect to "terms and conditions of employment," 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(d), the issue here is whether petitioners have discriminated against
female employees with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Even more so than in-plant food prices, retirement benefits are matters "of deep concern" to employees, id., at 498, and
plainly constitute an aspect of the employment relationship. Indeed, in
Ford we specifically compared in-plant food services to "other kinds of
benefits, such as health insurance, implicating outside suppliers." Id., at
503, n. 15. We do not think it makes any more difference here than it did
in Ford that the employer engaged third parties to provide a particular
benefit rather than directly providing the benefit itself.
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which party initially suggested inclusion of the discriminatory provisions. 22 It would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of Title VII 23 to hold that an employer who
adopts a discriminatory fringe benefit plan can avoid liability
on the ground that he could not find a third party willing to
treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory basis. An employer who confronts such a situation must either supply the
fringe benefit himself, without the assistance of any third
party, or not provide it at all.

tft

IV
We turn finally to the relief awarded by the District Court.
The court enjoined petitioners to ensure that future annuity
payments to retired female employees shall be equal to the
payments received by similarly situated male employees. 24
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975), we
22
See Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 673 F. 2d 742, 750-751
(CA5 1982), cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1983); Williams v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 665 F. 2d 918, 926 (CA9), mod. and reh. denied, 28 Fair
Emp. Cas. 1820, cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1982); Farmer v. ARA
Services , Inc., 660 F. 2d 1096, 1104 (CA6 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 635 F. 2d 1007, 1014 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 940 (1981);
United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc. , 479 F. 2d 354, 37~80 (CA8 1973);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791, 799 (CA4), cert. dismissed, 404
u. s. 1006 (1971).
23
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418, 421
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S., at 429-430.
24
The court did not explain its reasons for choosing this remedy.
Apart from their contention that they have not violated Title VII, which
we have rejected, petitioners do not challenge so much of the District
Court's judgment as enjoins them from carrying out their statutory obligations in the future through the use of sex-based actuarial tables. (We
were informed at oral argument that the State no longer offers employees
the opportunity to invest in annuity contracts. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 8.)
Since respondents did not appeal the District Court's refusal to award
damages for benefit payments made prior to the court's decision, see n. 5,
supra, we have no occasion to consider the correctness of that ruling.
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emphasized that one of the main purposes of Title VII is "to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Id., at 418. We recognized that there is a strong presumption that "[t]he injured
party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he
would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed."
Id., at 418--419, quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 99
(1867). Once a violation of the statute has been found, retroactive relief "should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination." 422 U. S., at 421 (footnote omitted).
Applying this standard, we held that the mere absence of bad
faith on the part of the employer is not a sufficient reason for
denying such relief. I d., at 422--423.
Although this Court noted in Manhart that "[t]he Albemarle presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom
be overcome," 435 U. S., at 719, the Court concluded that
under the circumstances the District Court had abused its
discretion in requiring the employer to refund to female employees all contributions they were required to make in excess of the contributions demanded of men. The Court explained that "conscientious and intelligent administrators of
pension funds, who did not have the benefit of the extensive
briefs and arguments presented to us, may well have assumed that a program like the Department's was entirely
lawful," since "[t]he courts had been silent on the question,
and the administrative agencies had conflicting views." Id.,
at 720 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that retroactive relief based on "[ d]rastic changes in the legal rules
governing pension and insurance funds" can "jeopardiz[e] the
insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insureds' benefits,"
id., at 721, and that the burden of such relief can fall on innocent third parties. I d., at 722--723.
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While the relief ordered here affects only benefit payments
made after the date of the District Court's judgment, it does
not follow that the relief is wholly prospective in nature, as
an injunction concerning future conduct ordinarily is, and
should therefore be routinely awarded once liability is established. When a court directs a change in benefits based on
contributions made before the court's order, the court is
awarding relief that is fundamentally retroactive in nature.
This is true because retirement benefits under a plan such as
that at issue here represent a return on contributions which
were made during the employee's working years and which
were intended to fund the benefits without any additional
contributions from any source after retirement.
A recognition that the relief awarded by the District Court
is partly retroactive is only the beginning of the inquiry.
Absent special circumstances a victim of a Title VII violation
is entitled to whatever retroactive relief is necessary to undo
any damage resulting from the violation. See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 418-419, 421. As to any
disparity in benefits that is attributable to contributions
made after our decision in Manhart, we conclude that there
are no special circumstances justifying the denial of retroactive relief. Our ruling today was clearly foreshadowed by
Manhart. That decision should have put petitioners on notice that a man and a woman who make the same contributions to a retirement plan must be paid the same monthly
benefits. 25 To the extent that any disparity in benefits com0nly one of the several lower court decisions since Manhart has accepted the argument that the principle established in that decision is limited to plans that require women to make greater contributions than men,
seen. 9, supra, and no court has held that an employer can assert as a defense that the calculation and payment of retirement benefits is made by
third parties selected by the employer. See also Van Alstyne, supra, 64
AAUP Bulletin, at 152-155 (predicting that the the involvement of an independent insurer would not be recognized as a defense and noting that an
25
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ing due after the date of the District Court's judgment is
attributable to contributions made after Manhart, there is
therefore no unfairness in requiring petitioners to pay retired
female employees whatever sum is necessary each month to
bring them up to the benefit level that they would have enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated in
the same way as those of similarly situated male employees.
To the extent, however, that the disparity in benefits that
the District Court required petitioners to eliminate is attributable to contributions made before Manhart, we think the
court gave insu~cient attention to this Court's recognition in
Manhart that until that decision the use of sex-based tables
might reasonably have been assumed to be lawful. Insofar
as this portion of the disparity is concerned, we think the District Court should have inquired into the circumstances in
which petitioners, after Manhart, could have applied sexneutral tables to the pre-Manhart contributions of a female
employee and a similarly situated male employee without violating any contractual rights that the latter might have had
on the basis of his pre-Manhart contributions. If, in the case
of a particular female employee and a similarly situated male
employee, petitioners could have applied sex-neutral tables
to pre-Manhart contributions without violating any contractual right of the male employee, they should have done so in
order to prevent further discrimination in the payment of retirement benefits in the wake of this Court's ruling in
Manhart. 26 Since a female employee in this situation should
employer offering a sex-based retirement plan funded by such an insurer
would be well advised to act expeditiously to bring himself into compliance
with the law).
211
Since the actual calculation and payment of retirement benefits was in
the hands of third parties under the Arizona plan, petitioners would not
automatically have been able to apply sex-neutral tables to pre-Manhart
contributions even if pre-existing contractual rights posed no obstacle.
However, petitioners were in a position to exert influence on the companies participating in the plan, which depended upon the State for the busi-
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have had sex-neutral tables applied to her pre-Manhart contributions, it is only fair that petitioners be required to supplement any benefits coming due after the District Court's
judgment by whatever sum is necessary to compensate her
for their failure to adopt sex-neutral tables.
If, on the other hand, sex-neutral tables could not have
been applied to the pre-Manhart contributions of a particular
female employee and any similarly situated male employee
without violating the male employee's contractual rights, it
would be inequitable to award such relief. To do so would be
to require petitioners to compensate the female employee for
a disparity attributable to pre-Manhart conduct even though
such conduct might reasonably have been assumed to be lawful and petitioners could not have done anything after
Manhart to eliminate that disparity short of expending State
funds. With respect to any female employee determined to
fall in this category, petitioners need only ensure that her
monthly benefits are no lower than they would have been had
her post-Manhart contributions been treated in the same
way as those of a similarly situated male employee.
The record before us does not indicate whether some or all
of the male participants in the plan who had not retired at the
time Manhart was decided 2:1 had any contractual right to a
particular level of benefits that would have been impaired by
the application of sex-neutral tables to their pre-Manhart
ness generated by the deferred compensation plan, and we see no reason
why petitioners should stand in a better position because they engaged
third parties to pay the benefits than they would be in had they run the
entire plan themselves.
27
Since the amount of monthly annuity payments is ordinarily fixed by
the time of retirement, we assume that sex-neutral tables could not have
been applied after Manhart to male employees who had retired before that
decision without violating their contractual rights. If this assumption is
correct, it would follow from what we have said above that no member of
the respondent class who retired before Manhart would be entitled to
relief.

82-52-0PINION
20

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITIEE v. NORRIS

contributions. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed in part and vacated in part and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Its purpose, of course, is broadly to proscribe
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Moreover, Congress consistently has chosen to leave the
regulation of the insurance industry to the respective
states.
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u.s.c.

McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended,
§1011, et seq.
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Of course, nothing in the language of Title VII
supports this preemption of state jurisdiction nor has the
Court identified any evidence in the legislative history
that Congress considered the widespread use sex-based
mortality tables to be discriminatory or that Congress
intended to modify its previous grant by the McCarranFerguson Act of exclusive jurisdiction to the states to
regulate the terms of protection offered by insurance
companies.
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The effect of employment practices on the

individual that Title VII addresses simply is inapplicable
to a determination of the risk element where one's life
span is a relevant factor.

It is precisely because the

life span of a single individual cannot be predicted that
insurance companies must rely on mortality tables based on
long experience of identifiable groups.

As is conceded,

actuarial statistics establish beyond question that women
as a group outlive men.

Similarly, though with far less

reliability, different actuarial predictions are made
based upon a variety of other factors that distinguish
large groups of people.
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As indicated above, the consequences of the
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Court's holding are ..unlikely to be beneficial:

(i)

~

insurance carriers may choose, as some already have, not
to write unisex annuities; (ii) those that do choose to
offer such annuities will pass on the increased cost to
someone, certainly not excluding the purchasers; or (iii)
employers will elect simply not to provide these
annuities.
this result.

There is no evidence that Congress intended
Nor does Menhart fairly support this

sweeping extension of Title VII.
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Rives:

Add a footnote along the following lines:

This case involves the state of Arizona.
Presumably other state and local governments will be
directly affected by today's decision.

Imposing

unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indicated
comes at a time when many states and local governments
already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal
deficits.
increased.

Income, excise and property taxes are being
I can perceive of no justification whatever

for the United States Supreme Court, particularly in view
of the question left open in Manhart, imposing this

2.

enormous retroactive burden upon the public - and, of
course, it will be the public who bear it.
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NORRIS13 SALLY-POW
III
The policies underlying Title VII, rather than
supporting the Court's decision, strongly suggest - at
least for me - the opposite.

This remedial statute was

enacted to eradicte the types of discrimination in
employment that then were pervasive in our society.

The

entire thrust of Title VII is directed against
discrimination.

As Justice Blackmun has made clear with

clarity and brevity, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that demonstrably differentiates
females from males and that is not measurable on an
individual basis • • • • [T]here is nothing arbitrary,
irrational or discriminatory about recognizing the

2.

objective and accepted • • . disparity in the female-male
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement
plans".

Manhart, 435

u.s.,

concurring in the judgment).

at 724 (concurring in part and
Despite the absence of any

discrimination in the normal understanding of that term,
and also ignoring the proven accuracy and efficiency of
mortality tables, the Court reads into Title VII a meaning
and purpose never intended.

A justification curiously

relied on by the Court is its view that sex
classifications should be treated no differently - in the
context of this case - from racial classification.
at 9 (Rives:

Ante,

would it make any sense to cite in footnote

cases where we have refused to apply strict strutiny to
sex classifications?)

This reasoning, based solely on the

perceived "effect" of unisex tables, also would apply to

3.

the disparte impact on men that will result from today's
decision.

Men as a class, if this type of benefit

continues to be offered by insurance carriers, will
receive less aggregate benefits for the same price than
women.

If the Court is correct in finding sex and race

comparable for the purposes of its decision today on a
theory of disparate impact, what will it say when men - as
well they may- assert a violation of Title VII based on
the disparate treatment of them. 11

The difficulty, of

course, arises not because of any discrimination in its
normal sense but from today's decision that wholly
distorts that understanding.

Rives:

I may not be "on target" in suggesting

revision of pages 13 and 14.

I realize this is a "touchy"

4.

area.

Yet, I believe the basic thought is correct, and if

we can state it in a sound and lawyerlike way, I would
like to do it.

In this connection, to what extent do

briefs may this argument?

In my view, HAB's

position on non-discrimination is a more telling point
than the impact on the insurance industry.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

-

Justice Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its
employees life annuities from a private insurance company
that uses sex-based mortality tables. This holding will have
a far-reaching effect on the operation of insurance and pension plans. Employers may be forced to discontinue offering
life annuities, or potentially disruptive changes may be required in long-established methods of calculating insurance
and pensions. 1 Either course will work a major change in
'The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive.
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years.
United States Department of Labor, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 (1983) (hereinafter Department of
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers 'will be
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption
may be unfounded. Employers may be required to "top up" benefitsi. e., calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable to men rather than
apply a unisex rate to both men and women. See n. 10, infra. If so, the
cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to
$676 million each year for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor
Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be
passed on-in large part-to the annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of
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the way the cost of insurance is determined-probably to the
detriment of all employees. This is contrary to our explicit
recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 717 (1978), that Title VII "was [not]
intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." The Court adds to this disruption by making its decision retroactive, thereby imposing potentially crippling burdens on both public and private employers. 2
I
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a voluntary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a portion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the employee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires,
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life
annuity.
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates
between men and women when an employee contributes to
the fund. The plan is voluntary and each employee may contribute as much as he or she chooses. Nor does anyone contend that either of the first two methods of repaying the accrued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dispute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights
state and local governments, to the public.
2
The Court's limited retroactive remedy may entail additional annual
costs of $572 million to $886 million for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor Cost Study 33. These figures assume, as the Court appears
to require, see ante, at 18, that employers will have to top up benefit~.
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Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. The first two
options, however, have disadvantages. If an employee
chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability will be
substantial. 3 The second option ameliorates the tax problem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over a
fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard
against the possibility that the finite number of payments selected by the employee will fail to provide income for the remainder of his or her life.
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liability by spreading the payments out over time, and it guarantees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 38--871(C)(l). But to achieve tax benefits under federal
law, the life annuity must be purchased from a company designated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 68--99, 1968--1 Cum. Bull193. Accordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance companies to make life annuities available to its employees. The
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast
majority of private insurance companies in the United States,
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Arizona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase
on the open market.
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates
Title VII. In its view, Title VII requires an employer to follow one of three courses. An employer must provide unisex
annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide
such annuities, or provide no annuities to its employees.
Ante, at 15. The Court's first option is largely illusory.
' The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as
income. See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum, Bull 193.
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Most employers do not have either the financial resources or
administrative ability to underwrite annuities. Or, as in this
case, state law may prevent an employer from providing annuities. If unisex annuities are available, an employer may
contract with private insurance companies to provide them.
It is stipulated, however, that the insurance companies with
which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor
do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The insurance industry either is prevented by state law from doing
so 4 or it views unisex mortality tables as actuarially unsound. An employer, of course, may choose the Court's
third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees
the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving.
It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled choice.
II
As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's holding are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carriers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be denied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 5 If, alternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer
4
See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(0 (West) (requiring differentials
based on the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that State of
New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates).
5
This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liability resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona discontinued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect of today's holding apparently will fall primarily on the State's employees.
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these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits
probably will be passed on to current employees. There is
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping reading of this statute. That case expressly recognized the limited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legislative history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's
policies to the insurance industry.
A

We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the question before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was limited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice violated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." Ibid.
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insurance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the respective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33,
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 6 This Act reflects the
6

When, for example, this Court held for the first time that the federal
government had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944),
Congress responded quickly by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The
Act commits the regulation of the insurance and pension industry presumptively to the States. Section 2(b) of the Act provides: "No Act of Congress
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . .. unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15
U. S. C. § 1012(b).
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long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent
policy of entrusting insurance and pension regulation to the
States, the Court is not justified in assuming that Congress
intended in 1964 to require the industry to change longstanding actuarial methods, approved over decades by state
insurance commissions. 7
Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this preemption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the Court identified
any evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to be
discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous
grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdiction to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history indicates precisely the opposite.
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Senate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and
women under industrial benefit plans. See 110 Gong. Rec.
13663--13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "[alt]hough he did not address differences in employee contributions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed
' Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require that there
be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey,
Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). Most of these States have determined that the use of sex-based mortality tables comports with this
state definition of discrimination.
Given the presumption of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that "specifically relat[e] to the
business of insurance," seen. 6, supra, the Court offers no satisfactory reasons for concluding that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt this important area of state jurisdiction.
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that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing
pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Senator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance
industry.
B

As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative
history supports its holding, the Court is compelled to rely on
its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The policy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in employment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifically on the individual and "precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual
or national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little
relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Insurance and life annuities exist because it is
impossible to measure accurately how long any one individual
will live. Insurance companies cannot make individual
determinations of life expectancy; they must consider instead
the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a sufficiently large group of people, an insurance company can predict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of
deaths within the group based on the past mortality experience of similar groups. Title VII's concern for effect of employment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplicable to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing
insurance and annuities.

c

The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus
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requires that an insurance company group individuals according to attributes that have a significant correlation with mortality. The most accurate classification system would be to
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be prohibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of longevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable.
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982).
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classification-that the Court ultimately condemns. See ante, at
8-10. The policies underlying Title VII, rather than supporting the Court's decision, strongly suggest-at least for
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was enacted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of
Title VII is directed against discrimination-disparate
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or arbitrarily affects an individual. But as JusTICE BLACKMUN
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is nothing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recognizing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans".
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications,
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not automatically invalid. 8 Where, as here, the use of sex-based
• Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications, but rather
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mortality tables does not entail discrimination in any normal
understanding of that term, 9 I would be reluctant to hold the
practice invalid.
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classifications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended
to do so in Title VII. Nor does the policy underlying Title
VII provide any warrant for extending the reach of the statute beyond Congress' intent.
III
The Court compounds the consequences of its decision by
making it retroactive. It holds that an employer must "pay
retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each
month to bring them up to the benefit level they would have
enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated
in the same way as those of similarly situated male employees." Ante, at 18. An employer also may be liable for an
additional amount. If an employer could have applied unisex
tables to an employee's pre-Manhart contributions without
altering existing contractual rights, the Court would require
an employer to contribute an additional amount to compensate employees for its failure to adopt unisex tables after
Manhart was announced. In my view, retroactive relief is
both unprecedented and manifestly unjust.
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief was normally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded
those that are based "on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes."
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 333 (1977). Indeed, while Manhart
held that an employer could not require women to contribute more to a
pension fund than a similarly situated man, it recognized that Title VII
does not prevent employers from offering annuity payments that reflect
the sexual composition of the workforce , see 435 U. S., at 718, and n. 34.
9
Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on
unisex mortality tables , men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits
than similarly situated women. The courts may find themselves faced
with suits in which men claim that this disparate treatment is itself a Title
VII violation.
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that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding
such relief. As we noted, the employer in that case may well
have assumed that its pension program was lawful. More
importantly, a retroactive remedy would have had a potentially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's
pension plan. As the Court explained, the business of underwriting pensions requires actuarial approximation of risk.
Reserves normally are sufficient to cover only the cost of
funding and administering the plan. Should an unforeseen
contingency occur, such as a drastic change in the legal rules
governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's
solvency and the insured's benefits could be jeopardized.
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 721.
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly excepted the insurance industry in general from the reach of its
holding. Given this explicit limitation, an employer reasonably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make
available to its employees the same annuities that could be
purchased on the open market.
As in Manhart, making the holding retroactive, even in a
limited fashion, could have devastating results. The holding
applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost
of compliance is estimated to range from $572 million to $886
million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. 10 Department of
0
' The cost of equalizing benefits for employers will vary according to
three factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a definedbenefit plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or prospectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between
men and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top
up women's benefits. The last two factors have the most significant effect
on cost. The Court today embraces a form of limited retroactivity. It
also appears to require that benefits must be topped up. See ante, at 18.
In any event, if annuity payments are regarded as a form of compensation,
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Labor Cost Study 33. In this case, the cost will fall on the
State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local governments will be directly affected by today's decision. Imposing unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indicated comes at a time when many States and local
governments already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal
deficits. Income, excise, and property taxes are being increased. I can perceive of no justification for this Court,
particularly in view of the question left open in Manhart, to
impose this magnitude of burden retroactively upon the public-and, of course, it will be the public that bears it.

as the Court also appears to suggest, see ante, at 5, the Equal Pay Act may
require independently that all benefits be topped up, see 77 Stat. 56, 29

u. s. c.

§ 206(d).

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its
employees life annuities from a private insurance company
that uses sex-based mortality tables. This holding will have
a far-reaching effect on the operation of insurance and pension plans. Employers may be forced to discontinue offering
life annuities, or potentially disruptive changes may be required in long-established methods of calculating insurance
and pensions. 1 Either course will work a major change in
1
The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive.
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years.
United States Department of Labor, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 (1983) (hereinafter Department of
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers will be
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption
may be unfounded. Employers may be required to "top up" benefitsi. e. , calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable to men rather than
apply a unisex rate to both men and women. Seen. 11, infra. If so, the
cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to
$676 million each year for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor
Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be
passed on-in large part-to the annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of

.•
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the way the cost of insurance is determined-probably to the
detriment of all employees. This is contrary to our explicit
recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 717 (1978), that Title VII "was [not]
intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." The Court adds to this disruption by making its decision retroactive, thereby imposing potentially crippling burdens on both public and private employers. 2
I
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a voluntary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a portion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the employee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires,
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life
annuity.
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates
between men and women when an employee contributes to
the fund. The plan is voluntary and each employee may contribute as much as he or she chooses. Nor does anyone contend that either of the first two methods of repaying the accrued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dispute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights
state and local governments, to the public.
' The Court's limited retroactive remedy may entail additional annual
costs of $572 million to $886 million for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor Cost Study 33. These figures assume, as the Court appears
to require, see ante, at 18, that employers will have to top up benefits.
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Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. The first two
options, however, have disadvantages. If an employee
chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability will be
substantial. 3 The second option ameliorates the tax problem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over a
fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard
against the possibility that the finite number of payments selected by the employee will fail to provide income for the remainder of his or her life.
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liability by spreading the payments out over time, and it guarantees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-871(C)(1). But to achieve tax benefits under federal
law, the life annuity must be purchased from a company designated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 6~99, 196~1 Cum. Bull193. Accordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance companies to make life annuities available to its employees. The
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast
majority of private insurance companies in the United States,
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Arizona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase
on the open market.
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates
Title VII. In its view, Title VII requires an employer to follow one of three courses. An employer must provide unisex
annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide
such annuities, or provide no annuities to its employees.
Ante, at 15. The Court's first option is largely illusory.
The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as
income. See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193.
3
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Most employers do not have either the financial resources or
administrative ability to underwrite annuities. Or, as in this
case, state law may prevent an employer from providing annuities. If unisex annuities are available, an employer may
contract with private insurance companies to provide them.
It is stipulated, however, that the insurance companies with
which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor
do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The insurance industry either is prevented by state law from doing
so 4 or it views unisex mortality tables as actuarially unsound. An employer, of course, may choose the Court's
third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees
the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving.
It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled choice.
II

As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's holding are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carriers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be denied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 5 If, alternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer
'See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(f) (West) (requiring differentials
based on the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that State of
New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates).
• This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liability resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona discontinued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect oftoday's holding apparently will fall primarily on the State's employees.
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these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits
probably will be passed on to current employees. There is
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping reading of this statute. That case expressly recognized the limited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legislative history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's
policies to the insurance industry.
A

We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the question before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was limited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice violated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." Ibid.
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insurance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the respective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33,
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 6 This Act reflects the
long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the sevWhen this Court held for the first time that the federal government
had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944), Congress responded quickly by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Act commits the regulation of the insurance and pension industry presumptively to
the States. Section 2(b) of the Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b).
6
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eral States of the business of insurance is in the public interest." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent
policy of entrusting insurance and pension regulation to the
States, the Court is not justified in assuming that Congress
intended in 1964 to require the industry to change longstanding actuarial methods, approved over decades by state
insurance commissions. 7
Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require that there
be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey,
Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). Most of these States have determined that the use of sex-based mortality tables comports with this
state definition of discrimination.
Given the presumption of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that "specifically relat[e] to the
business of insurance," seen. 6, supra, the Court offers no satisfactory reasons for concluding that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt this important area of state jurisdiction.
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their brief. See ante, at
13-14, n. 17. This misses the point. The question presented is whether
Congress intended Title VII to prevent employers from offering their employees actuarially sound sex-based annuities. The McCarran-Ferguson
Act is explicitly relevant to determining congressional intent. It provides
that courts should not presume that Congress intended to supersede state
regulation of insurance unless the act in question specifically relates to the
business of insurance. See n. 6, supra. It therefore is necessary to consider the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This presents two
questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII involves the "business of insurance" and whether the application of Title VII would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law.
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be spread
among classes of insureds is an integral part of the "business of insurance."
See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 213
(1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S. 65, 73 (1959). The Court
argues, nevertheless, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite because Title VII will not supersede any state regulation. See ante, at 14, n.
17. This argument simply ignores self-evident facts. State insurance
7
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Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this preemption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the Court identified
any evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to be
discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous
grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdiction to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history indicates precisely the opposite.
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Senate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and
women under industrial benefit plans. 8 See 110 Cong. Rec.
laws allow employers to purchase sex-based annuities for their employees,
as Arizona does here. Title VII, as the Court interprets it, would prohibit
employers from purchasing such annuities for their employees. It begs
reality to say that a federal law that prevents a purchaser of insurance
from doing what state insurance laws allow does not "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" state law. Cf. 359 U. S., at 67. Because the Court seeks to
extend Title VII in a way that would pre-empt state regulatory authority,
the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are directly applicable.
8
Senator Humphrey's statement was based on the adoption of the Bennett amendment, which incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal
Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), into Title VII. See County of
Washington, Ore. v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 175, n. 15 (1981). Although
not free from ambiguity, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act provides ample support for Senator Humphrey's interpretation of that Act.
In explaining the affirmative defenses, the Senate Report on the Equal
Pay Act noted that pension costs were "higher for women than men . . .
because of the longer life span of women." S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1963). It then explained that the question of the associated
additional cost was one "that can only be answered by an ad hoc investigation." Ibid. Thus, it concluded that where it could be shown that there
were in fact higher costs for women than men, an exception to the Equal
Pay Act could be permitted "similar to those ... for a bona fide seniority
system or other exception noted above." Ibid.
Even if other meanings might be drawn from the Equal Pay Act's legis-
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13663-13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "(alt]hough he did not address differences in employee contributions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed
that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing
pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Senator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance
industry.
B

As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative
history supports its holding, the Court is compelled to rely on
its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The policy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in employment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifically on the individual and "precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual
or national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little
relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Insurance and life annuities exist because it is
impossible to measure accurately how long any one individual
will live. Insurance companies cannot make individual
determinations of life expectancy; they must consider instead
the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a sufficiently large group of people, an insurance company can predict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of
deaths within the group based on the past mortality experilative history, the crucial question is how Congress viewed the Equal Pay
Act in 1964 when it incorporated it into Title VII.
The only relevant legislative history that exists on this point demonstrates unmistakably that
Con,gress perceived-with good reason-that "the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing pension plans." Manhart, 435 U. S. , at 714 .

.
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ence of similar groups. Title VII's concer_n for effect of employment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplicable to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing
insurance and annuities.

c

The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus
requires that an insurance company group individuals according to attributes that have a significant correlation with mortality. The most accurate classification system would be to
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be prohibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of longevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable.
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982).
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classification-that the Court ultimately condemns. See ante, at
8-10. The policies underlying Title VII, rather than supporting the Court's decision, strongly suggest-at least for
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was enacted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of
Title VII is directed against discrimination-disparate
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or arbitrarily affects an individual. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is noth-
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ing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recognizing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans".
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications,
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not automatically invalid. 9 Where, as here, the use of sex-based
mortality tables does not entail discrimination in any normal
understanding of that term, 10 I would be reluctant to hold the
practice invalid.
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classifications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended
to do so in Title VII. Nor does the policy underlying Title
VII provide any warrant for extending the reach of the statute beyond Congress' intent.
III
The Court compounds the consequences of its decision by
making it retroactive. It holds that an employer must "pay
retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each
month to bring them up to the benefit level they would have
enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated
in the same way as those of similarly situated male employees." Ante, at 18. An employer also may be liable for an
additional amount. If an employer could have applied unisex
tables to an employee's pre-Manhart contributions without
altering existing contractual rights, the Court would require
an employer to contribute an additional amount to compensate employees for its failure to adopt unisex tables after
Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications, and there
is no reason for assuming that it intended to do so in this instance. See n.
8, supra.
10
Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on
unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits
than similarly situated women.
9
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Manhart was announced. In my view, retroactive relief is
both unprecedented and manifestly unjust.
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief was normally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded
that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding
such relief. As we noted, the employer in that case may well
have assumed that its pension program was lawful. More
importantly, a retroactive remedy would have had a potentially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's
pension plan. As the Court explained, the business of underwriting pensions requires actuarial approximation of risk.
Reserves normally are sufficient to cover only the cost of
funding and administering the plan. Should an unforeseen
contingency occur, such as a drastic change in the legal rules
governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's
solvency and the insured's benefits could be jeopardized.
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 721.
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly excepted the insurance industry in general from the reach of its
holding. Given this explicit limitation, an employer reasonably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make
available to its employees the same annuities that could be
purchased on the open market.
As in Manhart, making the holding retroactive, even in a
limited fashion, could have devastating results. The holding
applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost
of compliance is estimated to range from $572 million to $886
million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. 11 Department of
The cost of equalizing benefits for employers will vary according to
three factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a definedbenefit plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or prospectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between
11
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Labor Cost Study 33. In this case, the cost will fall on the
State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local governments will be directly affected by today's decision. Imposing unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indicated comes at a time when many States and local
governments already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal
deficits. Income, excise, and property taxes are being increased. I can perceive of no justification for this Court,
particularly in view of the question left open in Manhart, to
impose this magnitude of burden retroactively upon the public-and, of course, it will be the public that bears it.

men and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top
up women's benefits. The last two factors have the most significant effect
on cost. The Court today embraces a form of limited retroactivity. It
also appears to require that benefits must be topped up. See ante, at 18.
In any event, if annuity payments are regarded as a form of wages, as the
Court also appears to suggest, see ante, at 5, the Equal Pay Act may require independently that all benefits be topped up, see 77 Stat. 56, 29
u. s. c. § 206(d).
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Revision of note 7, pages 6-7:
Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require
that there be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same
class."

Bailey, Hutchinson, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to

Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976).
Arizona insurance law similarly provides that there shall be "no
unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class."
Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-448 (1982).

Ariz.

Most of these States, including

Arizona, have determined that the use of sex-based mortality tables
comports with this state definition of discrimination.

Given the

presumption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to
supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that
"specifically relate to the business of insurance," see n. 6, supra,
the Court offers no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress
intended Title VII to pre-empt this important area of state
regulation.
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not
relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their
brief.

See ante, at 13, n. 17.

This misses the point.

The

question presented is whether Congress intended Title VII to prevent
employers from offering their employees actuarially sound, sex-based
annuities.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act is explicitly relevant to

determining congressional intent.

It provides that courts should

not presume that Congress intended to supersede state regulation of

2.
insurance unless the act in question s~ecifically relates to the
business of insurance.

See n. 6, supra.

It therefore is necessary

to consider the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

This

presents two questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII
involves the "business of insurance" and whether the application of
Title VII would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law.
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be
spread among classes of insureds is an integral part of the
"business of insurance."
Drug Co., 440

u.s.

See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal

205, 213 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359

U.S. 65, 73 (1959).

The Court argues, nevertheless, that the

McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite because Title VII will not
supersede any state regulation.

In the Court's view, "Arizona has

not purported to regulate the business of insurance, but has merely
created a deferred compensation plan for its employees in which
certain insurance companies participate."
(emphasis in original).

Ante, at 13, n. 17

This argument ignores self-evident facts.

State insurance laws, such as Arizona's, provide that there shall be
no unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class, and
employers have been allowed under these state laws to purchase sexbased annuities for their employees.

Title VII, as the Court

interprets it, would prohibit employers from purchasing such
annuities for their employees.

It begs reality to say that a

federal law that prevents a purchaser of insurance from doing what
state insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" state law.
67.

Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S., at

Because the Court seeks to extend Title VII in a way that would

3.

pre-empt state regulatory authority, the commands of the McCarranFerguson Act are directly relevant to determining Congress' intent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No . 82-52

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DEFERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983)

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its
employees life annuities from a private insurance company
that uses sex-based mortality tables. This holding will have
a far-reaching effect on the operation of insurance and pension plans. Employers may be forced to discontinue offering
life annuities, or potentially disruptive changes may be required in long-established methods of calculating insurance
and pensions. 1 Either course will work a major change in
' The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive.
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years.
United States Department of Labor, Cost tudy of the Impact of an Equal
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 0983) (hereinafter Department of
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employer s will be
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption
may be unfounded. Employers may be required to "top up" benefitsi. e., calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable to men rather than
apply a unisex rate to both men and women. Seen. 11, infra. If so, the
cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to
$676 million each year for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor
Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be
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the way the cost of insurance is determined-probably to the
detriment of all employees. This is contrary to our explicit
recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 717 (1978), that Title VII "was [not]
intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." The Court adds to this disruption by making its decision retroactive, thereby imposing potentially crippling burdens on both public and private employers. 2
I
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a voluntary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a portion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the employee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires,
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life
annuity.
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates
between men and women when an employee contributes to
the fund. The plan is.voluntary and each employee may contribute as much as he or she chooses. Nor does anyone contend that either of the first two methods of repaying the accrued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dispassed on-in large part-to the annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of
state and local governments, to the public.
2
The Court's limited retroactive remedy may entail additional annual
costs of $572 million to $886 million for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor Cost Study 33. These figures assume, as the Court appears
to require , see ante, at 18, that employers will have to top up benefits.
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pute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. The first two
options, however, have disadvantages. If an employee
chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability will be
substantial. 3 The second option ameliorates the tax problem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over a
fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard
against the possibility that the finite number of payments selected by the employee will fail to provide income for the remainder of his or her life.
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liability by spreading the payments out over time, and it guarantees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-871(C)(1) (1983). But to achieve tax benefits under federal law, the life annuity must be purchased from a company
designated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193. Accordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance companies to make life annuities available to its employees. The
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast
majority of private insurance companies in the United States,
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Arizona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase
on the open market.
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates
Title VII. In its view, Title VII requires an employer to follow one of three courses. An employer must provide unisex
annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide
such annuities, or provide no annuities to its employees.
The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as
income. See 26 U. S. C. § -liii: Rev. Rul. 68--99, 1968--1 Cum. Bull 193.
3

82-52-DISSENT
4

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE v. NORRIS

Ante, at 15. The Court's first option is largely illusory.
Most employers do not have either the financial resources or
administrative ability to underwrite annuities. Or, as in this
case, state law may prevent an employer from providing annuities. If unisex annuities are available, an employer may
contract with private insurance companies to provide them.
It is stipulated, however, that the insurance companies with
which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor
do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The insurance industry either is prevented by state law from doing
so~ or it views unisex mortality tables as actuarially unsound. An employer, of course, may choose the Court's
third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees
the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving.
It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled choice.
II
As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's holding are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carriers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be denied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 5 If, al'See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(f) (West) (1983) (requiring differentials based 0:1 the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers I nsurance and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that
State of New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates).
; This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liability resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona discontinued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect of today's holding apparently will fall primarily on the State's employees.
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ternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer
these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits
probably will be passed on to current employees. There is
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping reading of this statute. That case expressly recognized the limited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legislative history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's
policies to the insurance industry.
A

We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the question before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was limited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice violated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." Ibid.
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insurance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the respective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33,
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 0 This Act reflects the
' When this Court held for the first time that the federal government
had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). Congress responded quickly by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Act commits the regulation of the insurance and pension industry presumptively to
the States. Section 2(b) of the Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any Jaw enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 e. S. C. ~ 1012(b).
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long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent
policy of entrusting insurance regulation to the States, the
Court is not justified in assuming that Congress intended in
1964 to require the industry to change long-standing actuarial
methods, approved over decades by state insurance
commissions.'
'Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require that there
be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey,
Hutchinson, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance
Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779. i8:3 (1976). Arizona insurance law
similarly provides that there shall be "no unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-448 (1983). Most
of these States. including Arizona, have determined that the use of sexbased mortality tables comports with this state definition of discrimination.
Given the presumption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that
"specifically relate to the business of insurance," seen. 6, supra, the Court
offers no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress intended Title
VII to pre-empt this important area of state regulation.
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their brief. See ante, at 13,
n. 17. This misses the point. The question presented is whether Congress intended Title VII to prevent employers from offering their employees actuarially sound, sex-based annuities. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
is explicitly relevant to determining congressional intent. It provides that
courts should not presume that Congress intended to supersede state regulation of insurance unless the act in question specifically relates to the business of insurance. See n. 6, supra. It therefore is necessary to consider
the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This presents two questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII involves the "business of
insurance" and whether the application of Title VII would ''im·aliclate. impair, or supersede" state law.
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be spread
among classes of insureds is an integral part of the "business of insurance."
See Group Life & Health Ins . Co . v. R oyal D1·ug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 213
(19i9); SEC v. Variabl e Annuity Co .. 359 L' . S. 65, i3 (1959). The Court
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Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this preemption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the Court identified
any evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to be
discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous
grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdiction to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history indicates precisely the opposite.
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Senate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and
women under industrial benefit plans. 8 See 110 Cong. Rec.
argues, nevertheless, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite because Title VII will not supersede any state regulation. In the Court's
view, "Arizona has not purported to regulate the business of insurance,
but has merely created a deferred compensation plan for its employees in
which certain insurance companies participate." Ante, at 13, n. 17 (emphasis in original). This argument ignores self-evident facts. State insurance laws, such as Arizona's, provide that there shall be no unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class, and employers have
been allowed under these state laws to purchase sex-based annuities for
their employees. Title VII, as the Court interprets it, would prohibit employers from purchasing such annuities for their employees. It begs reality to say that a federal law that prevents a purchaser of insurance from
doing what state insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state Jaw. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S., at 67.
Because the Court seeks to extend Title VII in a way that would pre-empt
state regulatory authority, the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
are directly relevant to determining Congress' intent.
1
' Senator Humphrey's statement was based on the adoption of the Bennett amendment, which incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal
Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), into Title VII. See Co zwty r~f'
Washington, Ore. v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 175, n. 15 (1981). Although
not free from ambiguity, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act provides ample support for Senator Humphrey's interpretation of that Act.
In explaining the affirmative defenses. the Senate Report on the Equal
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13663-13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "[alt]hough he did not address differences in employee contributions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed
that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing
pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Senator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance
industry.

B
As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative
history supports its holding, the Court is compelled to rely on
its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The policy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in employment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifically on the individual and "precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual
or national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little
relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
Pay Act noted that pension costs were "higher for women than men . . .
because of the longer life span of women." S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1963). It then explained that the question of the associated
additional cost was one "that can only be answered by an ad hoc investigation." Ibid. Thus, it concluded that where it could be shown that there
were in fact higher costs for women than men, an exception to the Equal
Pay Act could be permitted "similar to those ... for a bona fide seniority
system or other exception noted above ." Ibid.
Even if other meanings might be drawn from the Equal Pay Act's legislative history, the crucial question is how Congress viewed the Equal Pay
Act in 1964 when it incorporated it into Title VII.
The only relevant legislative history that exists on this point demonstrates unmistakably that
Congress perceived-with good reason-that "the 1964 Act would have little , if any, impact on existing pension plans." Manhart, 435 U.S. , at 714.
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judgment). Insurance and life annuities exist because it is
impossible to measure accurately how long any one individual
will live. Insurance companies cannot make individual
determinations of life expectancy; they must consider instead
the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a sufficiently large group of people, an insurance company can predict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of
deaths within the group based on the past mortality experience of similar groups. Title VII's concern for effect of employment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplicable to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing
insurance and annuities.

c

The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus
requires that an insurance company group individuals according to attributes that have a significant correlation with mortality. The most accurate classification system would be to
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be prohibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of longevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable.
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982).
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classification-that the Court ultimately condemns. See ante, at
8--10. The policies underlying Title VII, rather than supporting the Court's decision, strongly suggest-at least for
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was en-
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acted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of
Title VII is directed against discrimination-disparate
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or arbitrarily affects an individual. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is nothing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recognizing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans."
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications,
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not automatically invalid. 9 Where, as here, the use of sex-based
mortality tables does not entail discrimination in any normal
understanding of that term, 10 I would be reluctant to hold the
practice invalid.
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classifications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended
to do so in Title VII. Nor does the policy underlying Title
VII provide any warrant for extending the reach of the statute beyond Congress' intent.
III
The Court compounds the consequences of its decision by
making it retroactive. It holds that an employer must "pay
retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each
month to bring them up to the benefit level they would have
enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated
9
Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications. and t here
is no reason for assuming that it intended to do so in this instance. See n.
8, supra.
0
' Indeed , if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on
unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits
t han similarly situated women.
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in the same way as those of similarly situated male employees." Ante, at 18. An employer also may be liable for an
additional amount. If an employer could have applied unisex
tables to an employee's pre-Manhart contributions without
altering existing contractual rights, the Court would require
an employer to contribute an additional amount to compensate employees for its failure to adopt unisex tables after
Manhart was announced. In my view, retroactive relief is
both unprecedented and manifestly unjust.
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief was normally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded
that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding
such relief. As we noted, the employer in that case may well
have assumed that its pension program was lawful. More
importantly, a retroactive remedy would have had a potentially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's
pension plan. As the Court explained, the business of underwriting pensions requires actuarial approximation of risk.
Reserves normally are sufficient to cover only the cost of
funding and administering the plan. Should an unforeseen
contingency occur, such as a drastic change in the legal rules
governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's
solvency and the insured's benefits could be jeopardized.
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 721.
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly excepted the insurance industry in general from the reach of its
holding. Given this explicit limitation, an employer reasonably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make
available to its employees the same annuities that could be
purchased on the open market.
As in Manhart, making the holding retroactive, even in a
limited fashion, could have devastating results. The holding
applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost
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of compliance is estimated to range from $572 million to $886
million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. 11 Department of
Labor Cost Study 33. In this case, the cost will fall on the
State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local governments will be directly affected by today's decision. Imposing unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indicated comes at a time when many States and local
governments already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal
deficits. Income, excise, and property taxes are being increased. I can perceive of no justification for this Court,
particularly in view of the question left open in Manhart, to
impose this magnitude of burden retroactively upon the public-and, of course, it will be the public that bears it.

" The cost of equalizing benefits for employers will vary according to
three factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a definedbenefit plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or prospectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between
men and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top
up women's benefits. The last two factors have the most -ignificant effect
on cost. The Court today embraces a fonn of limited retroacti\·ity. It
also appears to require that benefits must be topped up. See ante. at 18.
In any event, if annuity payments are regarded as a form of wages, as the
Court also appears to suggest, see ante, at 5, the Equal Pay Act may require independently that all benefits be topped up. see 77 Stat. 56, 29
U. S. C. § 206(d).
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 28, 1983

Re:

No. 82-52-Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In response to the revision in footnote 7 of the dissent
to include Arizona Stat. Ann. 1320-448, I have revised the
second and third paragraphs of footnote 17 on pages 13 and 14
of my opinion to read as follows:
Although petitioners contended in the Court of
Appeals that their conduct was exempted from the
reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §lOll et seq.,
they have made no mention of the Act in either their
petition for certiorari or their brief on the merits.
"[O]nly in the most exceptional cases will we consider
issues not raised in the petition," Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 481 n. 15 (1976); see Sup. Ct. R. 2l(a),
and but for the discussion of the question in the
dissent we would have seen no reason to address a
contention that petitioners deliberately chose to
abandon after it was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Since the dissent relies on the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, however, post, at 5-7, we think it is appropriate
to lay the matter to rest. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. 131012(b).
The application of Title VII in this case does not
supercede the application of any state law regulating
"the business of insurance." As the Court of · Appeals
explained, 671 F.2d, at 333, the plaintiffs in this
case have not challenged the conduct of the business
of insurance. No insurance company has been joined
as a defendant, and our judgment will in no way preclude
any insurance company from offering annuity benefits
that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated

-

2 -

actuarial tables. All that is at issue in this case
is an employment practice: the practice of offering
a male employee the opportunity to obtain greater
monthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a
similarly situated female employee.
It is this
conduct of the employer that is prohibited by Title
VII.
By its own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
applies only to the business of insurance and has no
application to employment practices. Arizona plainly
is not itself involved in the business of insurance,
since it has not underwritten any risks. See Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
U.S.
,
(1982)
(McCarran-Ferguson Act was "intended primarily to
protect 'intra-industry cooperation' in the underwriting or risks") (e mphasis in original), quoting
Group Life & He alth Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205, 221 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959) ("the concept of
'insurance' [for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act] involves some investment risk-taking on the part
of the company"). Because the application of Title
VII in this case does not superc e de any state law
governing the business of insurance, see Spirt v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F.2d, at 1064;
EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1266
(N.D. Ohio 1981), we need not decide whether Title
VII "specifically relates to the business of insurance"
within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Cf.
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515
F. Supp., at 302-306.
I have sent this change to the printer.
Sincerely,

~u:prtnu

Qf!tttrlllf flrt~ftb ~fatt.tr
..agJrhtgttttt. ~. <q. 21lpJl.~

CHAMBERS OP

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 29, 1983

Re:

J

82-52 - Arizona Governing Committee v.
Norris

Dear Thurgood:
My suggestion is that we apply for group
membership in "Alcoholics Affirmative."
On a more serious vein, you have my proxy.
Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

6/29/83

No. 82-52

Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and

in part.

(

dissent~

~ 'f4-J-"fJL "'( ~ ~J

This case requires us to determine whether Title VII
prohibits

an

employer

from offering

an

annuity

plan

in

which the participating insurance company uses sex-based
tables

for

calculating monthly benefit payments.

important to stress that our

judicial role

It

is

is simply to

discern the intent of the 88th Congress in enacting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 a statute covering
only discrimination in employment.

What we, if sitting as

legislators,

legislative

might

consider

irrelevant to our task.

wise

policy

is

Nor, as the majority notes, ante,

at 4, n. 4, do we have before us any constitutional challenge.

Finally, our decision must ignore (and our holding

has no necessary effect on)

the larger

issue of whether

considerations of sex should be barred from all insurance
plans,
issue

including

individual

that Congress

purchases

of

is currently debating.

insurance,
See S.

an
372,

1 The 92nd Congress made important amendments to Title
VII, including extending its coverage to state employers
such as the State of Arizona. The 1972 Amendments did not
change the substantive requirements of Title VII, however.
Thus, it is the intent of the 88th Congress that is controlling here.

\

2.

98th Cong., 1st Sess.
Sess.

{1983)

~

H. R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st

{1983) •
Although the issue presented for our decision is a

narrow one, the answer is far from self-evident.
many other

narrow

issues of

As with

statutory construction,

the

general language chosen by Congress does not clearly resolve the precise question.

Our polestar, however, must

be the intent of Congress, and the guiding lights are the
language, structure, and legislative history of Title VII.
Our inquiry is made somewhat easier by the fact that this
Court, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water And Pow~

the

v. Manhart, 435
88th Congress

u.s.
on a

related question.

Manhart found Title VII's focus on the
dispositive of the question before it.
ing Title VII

int~nt

of

The Court

in

702 {1978), analyzed the

individual to be
Congress in enact-

intended to prohibit an employer from sin-

gling out an employee by race or sex for

the purpose of

imposing a greater burden or denying an equal benefit because of a characteristic statistically identifiable with
the group but empirically false in many individual cases.
See Manhart; 435 U.S., at 708-710.
Despite the dissent's argument, ultimately I am persuaded

that

the

result

in Manhart

is

notdistinguishable

3.

from the present situation.

Manhart did note that Title

VII would allow an employer to set aside equal retirement
contributions for each employee and let the retiree purchase whatever

annuity his or

her

accumulated contr ibu-

tions could command on the open market.

Id., at 717-718.

In that situation, the employer is treating each employee
without regard to sex.

If an independent insurance compa-

ny then classifies persons on the basis of sex, the disadvantaged female worker cannot claim she was denied a privilege of employment, any more than she could complain of
employment
wages

discrimination

when

the

employer

pays

equal

in a community where local merchants charge women

more than men for
Title VII

identical items.

As I stressed above,

covers only discrimination

in employment,

and

thus simply does not reach these other situations.
Unlike

these

examples,

however,

the

employer

here

has done more than set aside equal lump sums for all employees.

Title VII clearly does not allow an employer to

offer

a

equal

contributions,

upon

plan

to

retirement

than women.

employees
hold

disburse

under
them

in

greater

which
a

it will

trust

monthly

collect

account,
checks

and

to men

Nor could an employer escape Title VII's man-

date by using a third-party bank to hold and manage the

4.

account.
used

In the situation at issue here, the employer has

third-party

insurance

companies

to

administer

the

plan, but the plan remains essentially a ''privileg[e] of
employment,'' and thus is covered by Title VII.

42

u.s.c.

§2000e-2 (a) (1). 2
For

these reasons,

I

join Parts I,

the opinion of the Court.

I

II, and III of

also share the concern ex-

pressed in Part IV that our mandate not apply retroactively to contributions collected before it became clear that
the plans at issue were inconsistent with Title VII.

The

Court would use the date of our decision in Manhart as the
triggering date.
would

use

point.

I

the

For reasons set forth below, however, I

date of

therefore

today' s

join

Part

decision as
III

of

the critical

JUSTICE

POWELL'S

opinion.
In Chevron Oil Co.

v.

Huson,

404 U.S.

97,

105-109

( 1971) , we set forth three criteria for determining when
to apply a decision of statutory interpretation prospec-

2The distinction between employment-related discrimination and discrimination not covered by Title VII is ably
discussed by Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or
Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court
Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 A. A. U. P. Bulletin 150
(1978).

5.

tively.

First, the decision must establish a new princi-

ple of law, either by overruling clear past precedent or
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution
was not clearly foreshadowed.

Id., at 106.

Ultimately, I

find this case controlled by the same principles of Title
VII articulated by the Court

in Manhart.

If this first

criterion were the sole consideration for prospectivity, I
might find it difficult to make today•s decision prospective.

As reflected in JUSTICE POWELL 1 S dissent, however,

whether

Manhart

foreshadows

today•s

decision

is

suffi-

ciently debatable that the first criteria of the Chevron
test

does

not compel

retroactivity here.

Therefore,

we

must examine the remaining criteria of the Chevron test as
well.
The second criterion is whether

retroactivity will

further or retard the operation of the statute.
supr~,

422

at 106-107.

u.s.

405,

421

Chevron,

See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
{1975)

{backpay should be denied only

for reasons that will not frustrate the central statutory
purposes).

Manhart held that a central purpose of Title

VII is to prevent employers from treating individual workers on the basis of sexual or racial group characteristics.

Although

retroactive

application will

not

retard

6.

the achievement of this purpose, that goal in no way requires retroactivity.
retroactive

holding

I see no reason to believe that a
is

necessary to ensure

that pension

plan administrators, who may have thought until our decision today that Title VII did not extend to plans involving

third-party

their
lowed

plans
equal

insurers,

to ensure
monthly

will

that

not

now

quickly

conform

individual employees are al-

benefits

regardless

of

sex.

See

Manhart, supra, at 720-721. 3
In my view, the third criterion--whether retroactive
application

would

impose

inequitable

results--compels

a

prospective decision in these circumstances.

Many working

men

decisions

and women

have

based

their

retirement

on

expectations of a certain stream of income during retirement.

These decisions depend on the existence of adequate

reserves to fund these pensions.
this

A retroactive holding by

Court that employers must disburse greater

annuity

3Another goal of Title VII is to make persons whole for
injuries suffered from unlawful employment discrimination.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 u.s. 405, 418
(1975). Although this goal would suggest that the present
decision should be made retroactive, it does not necessarily control the decision on retroactivity.
See Manhart,
supra, at 719.

7.

benefits

than

the

collected

contributions

would jeopardize the entire pension fund.

can

support

If a fund can-

not meet its obligations, '' [t]he harm would fall in large
part on innocent third parties.''
723.

This

Manhart, supra, at 722-

real danger of bankrupting pension funds

quires that our decision be made prospective.

re-

Such a pro-

spective holding is, of course, consistent with our equitable

powers

remedy.

See

under
42

Title VII

U.S.C.

to

fashion

§2000e-5 (g):

an

Manhart,

appropriate
supra,

at

718-719.
In my view,

then,

our holding should be made pro-

spective in the following sense.
ers

to

ensure

that

benefits

I would require employ-

derived

from

contributions

collected after our decision today be calculated without
regard to the sex of the beneficiary. 4

For contributions

4 In other words, I would require employers to use
longevity tables that reflect the average longevity of all
their workers.
The Equal Pay Act proviso, 29 u.s.c.
§206 (d) (1) (proviso), which forbids employers from curing
violations of the Act by reducing the wage rate of any
employee, would not require that employers ''top up''
benefits by using male-longevity tables for all workers.
First, although the Bennett Amendment of Title VII, 42
u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses for disparate ''compensation'' as well as disparate
''wages,'' see Manhart, supra, at 712, n. 22, the language
Footnote continued on next page.

8.

collected
allow

before

employers

our
and

decision

today,

participating

however,

insurers

to

I

would

calculate

the resulting benefits as they have in the past.

of the Equal Pay Act proviso seems to apply only to wages.
Thus, it is questionable whether the proviso would apply
at all to the retirement plan at issue here. Second, even
if the proviso has some relevance here, it should not be
read to require a pension plan, whose entire function is
actuar ially to balance contributions with outgoing benefits, to calculate benefits on the basis of tables that do
not reflect the composition of the work force.
Cf.
Manhart, supra, at 720, n. 36 {remedy should at least consider ''ordering a refund of only the difference between
contributions made by women and the contributions they
would have made under an actuarially sound and nondiscriminatory plan'').
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Lewis,
I am unable to join your position on the merits,
but I would like to join Part III of your opinion, where you
discuss prospectivity. Could you consider making the
following changes for me so that I may do so?
1) In my view, you speak of Manhart's open-market
exception somewhat too broadly. Could you replace the
second two sentences in the first full paragraph on page 10
with something like the following:
"Manhart did put all employeroperated pension funds on notice that they
could not "requir[e] that men and women make
unequal contributions to [the] fund," id., at
717, but it expressly confirmed that an-employer could set aside equal contributions
and let each retiree purchase whatever
benefit his or her contributions could
command "on the open market." Id., at 718.
Given this explicit limitation,-an employer
reasonably could have assumed that it would
be lawful to make available to its employees
annuities offered by insurance companies on
the open market."
2) Could you delete th~ last two sentences of
footnote 11? In my separate writing, I will state that
employers should use unisex tables in the future rather than
male-longevity tables for all workers. It seems to me it
would be useful to secure statements in your opinion as well
as mine that "topping up" is not required.

2.

3) Finally, in my last paragraph I express the view
that prospectivity means using unisex tables for
contributions made after our decision in Norris. I wonder
if you could state explicitly that this is your view of
prospectivity also.
Sincerely,

Sandra D. O'Connor

Justice Powell

.:§uprtnu Qicud cf tqt 'J!fui:tt~ .;§taftg

'lliagfringtcn. !9. QI.

20&1'!~

CHAMBERS OF

~~

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

ne 30, 1983

J

Re: No. 82-52-Arizona G

e;,,

~ ~

Committee v. Norris

Perhaps
tomorrow.
Sincerely,

d1tt.
I

T.M.

,

Circulated:

June 30, 1983

~

No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.
PER CURIAM.

deferred

Petitioners in this case administer a
plan for employees of the State of Arizona.

cornpen:'~(~2?:?

The respondent class

consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the plan or
will enroll in the plan in the future.

Certiorari was granted to

decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42

u.s.c.

§2000e et seq., prohibits an employer from

offering its employees the option of receiving retirement
benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer,
all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a
man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the
relief awarded by the District Court was proper.

The Court holds

..___.. that this practice does constitute discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits
derived from contributions made after the decision today must be
This

calculated without regard to the sex of the ben

7

position is expressed in Parts I, II,
opinion of JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, p.

_ __.,_..

JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE
O'CONNOR.

The Court further holds that

contributions made prior

by
and JUSTICE
enefits derived from
may be calculated as

provided by the existing terms of

plan.

position is expressed in Part III

the opinion of JUSTICE

POWELL, post ,_ p. _ _,

This

THE CHIEF JUSTICE,

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQU ST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR.
It is so ordered.

drk 06/30/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: Justice Marshall's proposed

per~uriam

in Norris:

I have no problem with most of the per curiam that Justice
Marshall circulated.

The only question that I have about it is his

reference to Part IV-A, which he lists Justice O'Connor as joining.
As things now stand, there is no Part IV-A, and Justice O'Connor has
joined only parts I, II, and III of his opinion.
According to Justice Marshall's clerk, they were thinking
of breaking their existing Part IV, which deals with remedy, into
two parts.

Part IV-A would say that having found liability, the

remedy should at the least be prospective--as Justice O'Connor
defines prospectivity.

Part IV-B would go on to say that Justice

Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, White and Stevens, would
require retroactive relief.

In this posture, Justice Marshall's

opinion would be sufficient to establish that at least there should
be prospective relief.

And Justice O'Connor's opinion, joining Part

IV-A but not Part IV-B, would limit the liability to prospective

/~

relief only.
My concern is that Part III of your opinion discussing
retroactivity might be seen as unnecessary.

Part IV-A of Justice

Marshall's opinion, combined with Justice O'Connor's opinion, would

2.

limit the relief in this case.

Your opinion would just be

expressing an additional sentiment on the issue.

The only virtue of

retaining Part III of your opinion would be a matter of emphasis.
Part IV-A of Justice Marshall's opinion would say at least
prospective relief is necessary and Part III of your opinion would
say at the most relief should be prospective.

I understand from

Justice O'Connor's clerk that she wants you to retain Part III if
possible.

It seems odd to me, however, for her to join

-

Marshall's section on relief and yours as well.
see no problems with Justice Marshall's proposal.
interested in seeing what he drafts as Part IV-A.
will be required in the opening paragraph of Par

Other
I
hanges
III.
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JusTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
This case requires us to determine whether Title VII prohibits an employer from offering an annuity plan in which the
participating insurance company uses sex-based tables for
calculating monthly benefit payments. It is important to
stress that our judicial role is simply to discern the intent of
the 88th Congress in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 1 a statute covering only discrimination in employment. What we, if sitting as legislators, might consider
wise legislative policy is irrelevant to our task. Nor, as JusTICE MARSHALL notes, ante, at 4, n. 4, do we have before us
any constitutional challenge. Finally, our decision must ignore (and our holding has no necessary effect on) the larger
issue of whether considerations of sex should be barred from
all insurance plans, including individual purchases of insurance, an issue that Congress is currently debating. See S.
'The 92nd Congress made important amendments to Title VII, including extending its coverage to state employers such as the State of Arizona.
The 1972 Amendments did not change the substantive requirements of
Title VII, however. Thus, it is the intent of the 88th Congress that is
controlling here.

/

)
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372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H. R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983).
Although the issue presented for our decision is a narrow
one, the answer is far from self-evident. As with many
other narrow issues of statutory construction, the general
language chosen by Congress does not clearly resolve the
precise question. Our polestar, however, must be the intent
of Congress, and the guiding lights are the language, structure, and legislative history of Title VII. Our inquiry is
made somewhat easier by the fact that this Court, in City of
Los Angeles Department of Water And Power v. Manhart,
435 U. S. 702 (1978), analyzed the intent of the 88th Congress
on a related question. The Court in Manhart found Title
VII's focus on the individual to be dispositive of the present
question. Congress in enacting Title VII intended to prohibit an employer from singling out an employee by race or
sex for the purpose of imposing a greater burden or denying
an equal benefit because of a characteristic statistically identifiable with the group but empirically false in many individual cases. See Manhart, 435 U. S., at 708-710.
Despite JUSTICE POWELL's argument, ultimately I am
persuaded that the result in Manhart is not distinguishable
from the present situation. Manhart did note that Title VII
would allow an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let the retiree purchase
whatever annuity his or her accumulated contributions could
command on the open market. ld., at 717-718. In that
situation, the employer is treating each employee without regard to sex. If an independent insurance company then classifies persons on the basis of sex, the disadvantaged female
worker cannot claim she was denied a privilege of employment, any more than she could complain of employment discrimination when the employer pays equal wages in a community where local merchants charge women more than men
for identical items. As I stressed above, Title VII covers

J
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only discrimination in employment, and thus simply does not
reach these other situations.
Unlike these examples, however, the employer here has
done more than set aside equal lump sums for all employees.
Title VII clearly does not allow an employer to offer a plan to
employees under which it will collect equal contributions,
hold them in a trust account, and upon retirement disburse
greater monthly checks to men than women. Nor could an
employer escape Title VII's mandate by using a third-party
bank to hold and manage the account. In the situation at
issue here, the employer has used third-party insurance companies to administer the plan, but the plan remains essentially a "privileg[e] of employment," and thus is covered by
Title VII. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 2
For these reasons, I join Parts I, II, and III of JUSTICE
MARSHALL's opinion. Unlike JUSTICE MARSHALL, however, I
would not make our holding retroactive. Rather, for reasons explained below, I agree with JUSTICE POWELL that our
decision should be prospective. I therefore join Part III of
JUSTICE POWELL's opinion.
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 105-109 (1971),
we set forth three criteria for determining when to apply a
decision of statutory interpretation prospectively. First,
the decision must establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. I d., at 106. Ultimately, I find this case controlled by
the same principles of Title VII articulated by the Court in
Manhart. If this first criterion were the sole consideration
2
The distinction . between employment-related discrimination and discrimination not covered by Title VII is ably discussed by Van Alstyne,
Equality for Individuals or Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 A. A. U. P. Bulletin 150
(1978).
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for prospectivity, I might find it difficult to make today's decision prospective. As reflected in JUSTICE POWELL'S dissent, however, whether Manhart foreshadows today's decision is sufficiently debatable that the first criterion of the
Chevron test does not compel retroactivity here. Therefore,
we must examine the remaining criteria of the Chevron test
as well.
The second criterion is whether retroactivity will further
or retard the operation of the statute. Chevron, supra, at
10~107. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 421 (1975) (backpay should be denied only for reasons
that will not frustrate the central statutory purposes).
Manhart held that a central purpose of Title VII is to prevent
employers from treating individual workers on the basis of
sexual or racial group characteristics. Although retroactive
application will not retard the achievement of this purpose,
that goal in no way requires retroactivity. I see no reason to
believe that a retroactive holding is necessary to ensure that
pension plan administrators, who may have thought until our
decision today that Title VII did not extend to plans involving third-party insurers, will not now quickly conform their
plans to ensure that individual employees are allowed equal
monthly benefits regardless of sex. See Manhart, supra, at
720-721. 3
In my view, the third criterion-whether retroactive application would impose inequitable results-compels a prospective decision in these circumstances. Many working men
and women have based their retirement decisions on expectations of a certain stream of income during retirement.
These decisions depend on the existence of adequate reserves
3
Another goal of Title VII is to make persons whole for injuries suffered from unlawful employment discrimination. See Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 (1975). Although this goal would suggest that the present decision should be made retroactive, it does not necessarily control the decision on retroactivity. See Manhart, supra, at 719.
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to fund these pensions. A retroactive holding by this Court
that employers must disburse greater annuity benefits than
the collected contributions can support would jeopardize the
entire pension fund. If a fund cannot meet its obligations,
"[t]he harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties." Manhart, supra, at 722-723. This real danger of
bankrupting pension funds requires that our decision be
made prospective. Such a prospective holding is, of course,
consistent with our equitable powers under Title VII to fashion an appropriate remedy. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g);
Manhart, supra, at 718-719.
In my view, then, our holding should be made prospective
in the following sense. I would require employers to ensure
that benefits derived from contributions collected after the
effective date of our judgment be calculated without regard
to the sex of the beneficiary. 1 For contributions collected
before the effective date of our judgment, however, I would
allow employers and participating insurers to calculate the
resulting benefits as they have in the past.
'In other words, I would require employers to use longevity tables that
reflect the average longevity of all their workers. The Equal Pay Act proviso, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (proviso), which forbids employers from curing
violations of the Act by reducing the wage rate of any employee, would not
require that employers "top up" benefits by using male-longevity tables for
all workers. First, although the Bennett Amendment of Title VII, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h), incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses for disparate "compensation" as well as disparate "wages," see Manhart, supra, at
712, n. 22, the language of the Equal Pay Act proviso seems to apply only
to wages. Thus, it is questionable whether the proviso would apply at all
to the retirement plan at issue here. Second, even if the proviso has some
relevance here, it should not be read to require a pension plan, whose entire function is actuarially to balance contributions with outgoing benefits,
to calculate benefits on the basis of tables that do not reflect the composition of the work force. Cf. Manhart, supra, at 720, n. 36 (remedy should
at least consider "ordering a refund of only the difference between contributions made by women and the contributions they would have made
under an actuarially sound and nondiscriminatory plan").
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation
plan for employees of the State of Arizona.

The respondent class

consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the plan or
will enroll in the plan in the future.

Certiorari was granted to

decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., prohibits an employer from
offering its employees the option of receiving retirement
benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer,
all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a
man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the
relief awarded by the District Court was proper.

The Court holds

that this practice does constitute discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits
derived from contributions made after the decision today must be
calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary.

This

position is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of
JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, p.

__,

which are joined by JUSTICE

BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR.
The Court further holds that benefits derived from contributions
made prior to this decision may be calculated as provided by the
existing terms of the Arizona plan.

This position is expressed

in Part III of the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, post, p. _ _, which
is joined

by~HE

CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE

REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR.
)

Accordingly, the judgment of

the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

~

- 2 the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

I

opinion.
It is so ordered.

_,I
!

PER CURIAM.
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation
plan for employees of the State of Arizona.

Respondent brought

this class action challenging the plan under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

u.s.c.

§2000e et seq.

The District Court certified a class action and entered summary
judgment for the respondent class, holding that the Arizona plan
discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.

The

District Court ordered petitioners to cease offering employees
annuities calculated on the basis of sex-based actuarial tables,
and to make such payments to retired female employees as are
necessary to ensure that the future monthly benefits they receive
are equal to those received by similarly situated male employees.
486 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1980).
Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The Court of Appeals for the

671 F.2d 330 (1982).

We granted

certiorari to decide whether the Arizona plan violates Title VII
and whether, if so, the relief ordered by the District Court was

u.s.

appropriate.

(1982).

The Court affirms so much of the Court of Appeals' judgment
as holds that the Arizona plan discriminates on the basis of sex
in violation of Title VII.

The position of the majority upon

this point is expressed by Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of
JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, p.

However, the Court reverses so

much of the judgment below as requires petitioners to eliminate

-

any disparity in the benefits received by members of the
respondent class that is attributable to contributions made prior
to our decision today.

The position of the majority upon this

-

2 -

point is expressed by Part III of the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL,
post, p.
It is so ordered.
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No. 82-52-Arizona v. Norris

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I have just received Sandra's opinion, "concurring
in part" which does not concur in . the judgment. That
means that I now have only three votes to join me in the
judgment. At this late date, I do not have a court and
do not know what to do at this stage. Any suggestions will
be welcomed by me.

;/111
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T.M.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE:

Case No. 82-52 - Arizona Governing Committee for Tax
Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans, etc. et al. v.
Norris, etc.

It is desirable that we confer immediately after we rise
Friday.
Among other things, the treatment of the split holding in
Arizona v. Norris can be discussed. Thurg'ood has five votes on
the merits of the central issue and Sandra has five votes on nonretroactivity.
The central issue, of course, is covered by Thurgood.

Regard£]

Copies to the Conference

July 1 , 1983

82-52 A:d.zona Governing Committee v. Norris

''

'

near Sandra.:
I agree with your suggestion that the mandate
issue on August 1.

Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfo/ss
cc:

The Conference
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No. 82-52

I

Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
With reference to the effective date of the
judgment, Frank Lorson suggested the following language
could be added as the last sentence of the~ curiam if the
Conference so desires:
The Clerk is directed to issue the
judgment August 1, 1983.
I think the addition would probably be appropriate
in view of all of the accounting work which the judgment
will require.
Sincerely,

drk 07/04/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

This copy reflects the changes that you had approved and a
few stylistic changes that struck me on rereading the opinion.

I

tried to change the use of the word Court to be consistent with the
fact that there is a per curiam opinion.

"Court" is used only when

your opinion refers to the holding contained in the per curiam.
When the opinion refers to the reasoning in Justice Marshall's
opinion explaining why Arizona's plan violates Title VII, it uses
the term "majority."

Reference to the majority usually is followed

by a cite to Justice Marshall's opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

I did this to be consistent with the per

curiam, which states that the majority's view on liability is
expressed in Justice Marshall's opinion.

1, /7 J 1?1 ;) I

S.f., JiJ l,' ~ cl!M ~

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Whits
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
/
'
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From: Justice Marshall
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUS-

,

.I

~CE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONN~

- - .JOin\ as to Parts I, II, and I.ll,'"concurring in t he judgment m

part, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join as to Part IV~~sel'ltiag in ~art ~
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U. S. 702 (1978), this Court held that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring
women to make larger contributions in order to obtain the
same monthly pension benefits as men. The question presented by this case is whether Title VII also prohibits an employer from offering its employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by
the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly benefits than a man who has made the same contributions.
I
A
Since 1974 the State of Arizona has offered its employees
the opportunity to enroll in a deferred compensation plan administered by the Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans (Govern-

0
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ing Committee). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38--371 et seq.;
Ariz. Regs. 2-9-01 et seq. Employees who participate in the
plan may thereby postpone the receipt of a portion of their
wages until retirement. By doing so, they postpone paying
federal income tax on the amounts deferred until after retirement, when they receive those amounts and any earnings
thereon. 1
After inviting private companies to submit bids outlining
the investment opportunities that they were willing to offer
State employees, the State selected several companies to
participate in its deferred compensation plan. Many of the
companies selected offer three basic retirement options: (1) a
single lump-sum payment upon retirement, (2) periodic payments of a fixed sum for a fixed period of time, and (3)
monthly annuity payments for the remainder of the employee's life. When an employee decides to take part in the deferred compensation plan, he must designate the company in
which he wishes to invest his deferred wages. Employees
must choose one of the companies selected by the State to
participate in the plan; they are not free to invest their deferred compensation in any other way. At the time an employee enrolls in the plan, he may also select one of the payout options offered by the company that he has chosen, but
when he reaches retirement age he is free to switch to one of
the company's other options. If at retirement the employee
decides to receive a lump-sum payment, he may also purchase any of the options then being offered by the other companies participating in the plan. Many employees find an annuity contract to be the most attractive option, since receipt
of a lump sum upon retirement requires payment of taxes on
the entire sum in one year, and the choice of a fixed sum for a
fixed period requires an employee to speculate as to how long
he will live.
'See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 72-25; Rev. Rul. 68-99; Rev. Rul.
60-31. Arizona's deferred compensation program was approved by the Internal Revenue Service in 1974.
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Once an employee chooses the company in which he wishes
to invest and decides the amount of compensation to be deferred each month, the State is responsible for withholding
the appropriate sums from the employee's wages and channelling those sums to the company designated by the employee. The State bears the cost of making the necessary
payroll deductions and of giving employees time off to attend
group meetings to learn about the plan, but it does not contribute any monies to supplement the employees' deferred
wages.
For an employee who elects to receive a monthly annuity
following retirement, the amount of the employee's monthly
benefits depends upon the amount of compensation that the
employee deferred (and any earnings thereon), the employee's age at retirement, and the employee's sex. All of the
companies selected by the State to participate in the plan use
sex-based mortality tables to calculate monthly retirement
benefits. App. 12. Under these tables a man receives
larger monthly payments than a woman who deferred the
same amount of compensation and retired at the same age,
because the tables classify annuitants on the basis of sex and
women on average live longer than men. 2 Sex is the only
factor that the tables use to classify individuals of the same
age; the tables do not incorporate other factors correlating
with longevity such as smoking habits, alcohol consumption,
weight, medical history, or family history. App. 13.
As of August 18, 1978, 1,675 of the State's approximately
35,000 employees were participating in the deferred compensation plan. Of these 1,675 participating employees, 681
were women, and 572 women had elected some form of future
2
Different insurance companies participating in the plan use different
means of classifying individuals on the basis of sex. Several companies
use separate tables for men and women. Another company uses a single
actuarial table based on male mortality rates, but calculates the annuities
to be paid to women by using a six-year "setback," i. e., by treating a
woman as if she were a man six years younger and had the life expectancy
of a man that age. App. 12.
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annuity option. As of the same date, 10 women participating in the plan had retired, and four of those 10 had chosen a
life-time annuity. App. 6.
B
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie Norris, an employee
in the Arizona Department of Economic Security, elected to
participate in the plan. She requested that her deferred
compensation be invested in the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company's fixed annuity contract. Shortly thereafter
Arizona approved respondent's request and began withholding $199.50 from her salary each month.
On April 25, 1978, after exhausting administrative remedies, respondent brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona against the State, the Governing Committee, and several individual members of the
Committee. Respondent alleged that the defendants were
violating § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), by administering an annuity plan that discriminates on the basis of
sex. Respondent requested that the District Court certify a
class under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) consisting of all female employees of the State of Arizona "who are enrolled or
will in the future enroll in the State Deferred Compensation
Plan." Complaint ~V.
On March 13, 1980, the District Court certified a class action and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff class, 3
holding that the State's plan violates Title VII. 4 486 F.
Supp. 645. The court directed petitioners to cease using
3
The material facts concerning the State's deferred compensation plan
were set forth in a statement of facts agreed to by all parties. App. 4-13.
'Although the District Court concluded that the State's plan violates
Title VII, the court went on to consider and reject respondent's separate
claim that the plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 486 F. Supp., at 651. Because respondent did not cross appeal from this ruling, it was not passed on by the Court of Appeals and is
not before us.
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sex-based actuarial tables and to pay retired female employees benefits equal to those paid to similarly situated men. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 671 F. 2d 330 (1982).
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Arizona plan violates Title VII and whether, if so, the relief ordered by the
District Court was proper. - - U. S. - - (1982).

II
We consider first whether petitioners would have violated
Title VII if they had run the entire deferred compensation
plan themselves, without the participation of any insurance
companies. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment
practice "to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There
is no question that the opportunity to participate in a deferred compensation plan constitutes a "conditio[n] or privileg[e] of employment," 6 and that retirement benefits constitute a form of "compensation." 7 The issue we must decide is
whether it is discrimination "because of ... sex" to pay a retired woman lower monthly benefits than a man who deferred the same amount of compensation.
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U. S. 702 (1978), we held that an employer had violated Title
VII by requiring its female employees to make larger con5
The court subsequently denied respondent's motion to amend the judgment to include an award of retroactive benefits to retired female employees as compensation for the benefits they had lost because the annuity
benefits previously paid them had been calculated on the basis of sexsegregated actuarial tables. Respondent did not appeal this ruling.
6
See Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., 483 F. 2d 490, 492, n. 3 (CA5),
cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1002 (1973).
7
See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702,
712, n. 23 (1978).
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tributions to a pension fund than male employees in order to
obtain the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Noting
that Title VII's "focus on the individual is unambiguous," id.,
at 708, we emphasized that the statute prohibits an employer
from treating some employees less favorably than others because of their race, religion, sex, or national origin. I d., at
708-709. While women as a class live longer than men, id.,
at 704, we rejected the argument that the exaction of greater
contributions from women was based on a "factor other than
sex"-i. e., longevity-and was therefore permissible under
the Equal Pay Act: 8
"[A]ny individual's life expectancy is based on a number
8
Section 703(h) of Title VII, the so-called Bennett Amendment, provides that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from "differentiat[ing]
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by [the Equal Pay Act]." 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2(h).
The Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), provides in pertinent part:
"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex:
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 77 Stat. 56, 29
u. s. c. § 206(d).
As in Manhart, 435 U. S., at 712, n. 23, we need not decide whether retirement benefits constitute "wages" under the Equal Pay Act, because the
Bennett Amendment extends the four exceptions recognized in the Act to
all forms of "compensation" covered by Title VII.
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of factors, of which sex is only one .... [O]ne cannot 'say
that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is
"based on any other factor than sex." Sex is exactly
what it is based on."' 435 U. S., at 712-713, quoting
553 F. 2d 581, 588 (CA9 1976), and the Equal Pay Act.
We concluded that a plan requiring women to make greater
contributions than men discriminates "because of . . . sex"
for the simple reason that it treats each woman "'in a manner
which but for [her] sex would [have been] different.'" 435
U. S., at 710, quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971).
We have no hesitation in holding, as have all but one of the
lower courts that have considered the question, 9 that the
classification of employees on the basis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the
pay-in stage. 10 We reject petitioners' contention that the Ar9
See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F. 2d 1054 (CA2
1982), cert. pending, No. 82-791; Retired Public Employees' Assn. of California v. California, 677 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-262;
Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. 295
(SDNY 1981); Hannahs v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System,
26 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 527 (SDNY 1981); Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement system, 27 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas. 1306 (CD Cal. 1981), appeal
docketed, Nos. 81-5865, 81-5866 (CA9 1981); Shaw v. Internat'l Assn. of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 24 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas 995 (CD Cal.
1980). Cf. EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F. 2d 1139 (CA11978). See also
29 CFR § 1604.9(f) (1982) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to have a pension or retirement plan ... which differentiates
in benefits on the basis of sex").
Only the Sixth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Peters v.
Wayne State University, 691 F. 2d 235 (1981), cert. pending, No. 82-794.
10
It is irrelevant that females employees in Manhart were required to
participate in the pension plan, whereas participation in the Arizona deferred compensation plan is voluntary. Title VII forbids all discrimination
concerning "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," not just discrimination concerning those aspects of the employment
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izona plan does not discriminate on the basis of sex because a
woman and a man who defer the same amount of compensation will obtain upon retirement annuity policies having approximately the same present actuarial value. 11 Arizona has
simply offered its employees a choice among different levels
of annuity benefits, any one of which, if offered alone,' would
be equivalent to the plan at issue in Manhart, where the employer determined both the monthly contributions employees
were required to make and the level of benefits that they
were paid. If a woman participating in the Arizona plan
wishes to obtain monthly benefits equal to those obtained by
a man, she must make greater monthly contributions than
he, just as the female employees in Manhart had to make
greater contributions to obtain equal benefits. For any particular level of benefits that a woman might wish to receive,
she will have to make greater monthly contributions to obtain
that level a benefits than a man would have to make. The
fact that Arizona has offered a range of discriminatory benefit levels, rather than only one such level, obviously provides
no basis whatsoever for distinguishing Manhart.
In asserting that the Arizona plan is nondiscriminatory berelationship as to which the employee has no choice. It is likewise irrelevant that the Arizona plan includes two options-the lump-sum option and
the fixed-sum-for-a-fixed-period option-that are provided on equal terms
to men and women. An employer that offers one fringe benefit on a discriminatory basis cannot escape liability because he also offers other benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis. Cf. Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 8 (1982).
11
The present actuarial value of an annuity policy is determined by multiplying the present value (in this case, the value at the time of the employee's retirement) of each monthly payment promised by the probability,
which is supplied by an actuarial table, that the annuitant will live to receive that payment. An annuity policy issued to a retired female employee under a sex-based retirement plan will have roughly the same
present actuarial value as a policy issued to a similarly situated man, since
the lower value of each monthly payment she is promised is offset by the
likelihood that she will live longer and therefore receive more payments.
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cause a man and a woman who have made equal contributions
will obtain annuity policies of roughly equal present actuarial
value, petitioners incorrectly assume that Title VII permits
an employer to classify employees on the basis of sex in predicting their longevity. Otherwise there would be no basis
for postulating that a woman's annuity policy has the same
present actuarial value as the policy of a similarly situated
man even though her policy provides lower monthly benefits. 12 This underlying assumption-that sex may properly
be used to predict longevity-is flatly inconsistent with the
basic teaching of Manhart: that Title VII requires employers
to treat their employees as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." 435
U. S., at 708. Manhart squarely rejected the notion that,
because women as a class live longer than men, an employer
may adopt a retirement plan that treats every individual
woman less favorably than every individual man. I d., at
716-717.
As we observed in Manhart, "[a]ctuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based on
race or national origin, as well as sex." I d., at 709 (footnote
omitted). If petitioners' interpretation of the statute were
correct, such studies could be used as a justification for paying employees of one race lower monthly benefits than employees of another race. We continue to believe that "a statute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the
employment market," ibid., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U. S. 424, 436 (1971), could not reasonably be construed
to permit such a racial classification. And if it would be unlawful to use race-based actuarial tables, it must also be unlawful to use sex-based tables, for under Title VII a distinc2
' See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., supra, 691 F. 2d, at
1061-1062; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimiation in
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512-514 (1980).
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tion based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinction
based on race unless it falls within one of a few narrow exceptions that are plainly inapplicable here. 13
What we said in Manhart bears repeating: "Congress has
decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on
national origin or race, are unlawful." 435 U. S., at 709.
The use of of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate retirement benefits violates Title VII whether or not the tables
reflect an accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a
class, for under the statute "[e]ven a true generalization
about [a] class" cannot justify class-based treatment. 14 Ibid.
13

The exception for bona fide occupational qualifications, 42 U. S. C.

§ 2000e-2(e), is inapplicable since the tenns of a retirement plan have noth-

ing to do with occupational qualifications. The only possible relevant exception recognized in the Bennett Amendment, see n. 8, supra, is inapplicable in this case for the same reason it was inapplicable in Manhart: a
scheme that uses sex to predict longevity is based on sex; it is not based on
"any other factor than sex." See 435 U. S., at 712 ("any individual's life
expectancy is based on any number of factors, of which sex is only one").
14
In his separate opinion in Manhart, JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed
doubt that that decision could be reconciled with this Court's previous decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert a
divided Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability benefit plan did not constitute discrimination "because of ... sex"
within the meaning of Title VII. The majority reasoned that the special
treatment of pregnancy distinguished not between men and women, but
between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons of both sexes. I d., at
135. The dissenters in Gilbert asserted that "it offends common sense to
suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly 'sex related,"' id., at 149 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), and that the special treatment of pregnancy constitutes sex
discrimination because "it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male." !d., at 162 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
The tension in our cases that JusTICE BLACKMUN noted in Manhart has
since been eliminated by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978 (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, in which Congress
overruled Gilbert by amending Title VII to establish that "the tenns
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ... because of or on the
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An individual woman may not be paid lower monthly benefits

simply because women as a class live longer than men. 16 Cf.
Connecticut v. Teal, - - U. S. - - (1982) (an individual
may object that an employment test used in making promobasis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. IV). See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, U. S. (1983).
The enactment of the PDA buttresses our holding in Manhart that the
greater cost of providing retirement benefits for women as a class cannot
justify differential treatment based on sex. 435 U. S., at 71&-717. JusTICE REHNQUIST's opinion for the Court in Gilbert relied heavily on the absence of proof that the employer's disability program provided less coverage for women as a class than for men. 429 U. S., at 138-139. In
enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that requiring employers to cover
pregnancy on the same terms as other disabilities would add approximately
$200 million to their total costs, but concluded that the PDA was necessary
"to clarify [the] original intent" of Title VII. H. R. Rep. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1978). Since the purpose of the PDA was simply to
make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII principles, see Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,-U. S., at--, and n. 16, Congress' decision to forbid special treament of
pregnancy despite the special costs associated therewith provides further
support for our conclusion in Manhart that the greater costs of providing
retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a
sex-based retirement plan. Cf. id., at--, n. 24. See also 29 CFR
§ 1604.9(e) (1982) ("It shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of
sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with
respect to one sex than the other.")
15
As we noted in Manhart, "insurance is concerned with events that are
individually unpredictable, but that is characteristic of many employment
decisions" and has never been deemed a justification for "resort to the
classifications proscribed by Title VII." 435 U. S., at 710. It is true that
properly designed tests can identify many job qualifications before employment, whereas it cannot be determined in advance when a particular employee will die. See id., at 724 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). For some jobs, however, there may be relevant skills that cannot be identified by testing. Yet Title VII clearly
would not permit use of race, national origin, sex, or religion as a proxy for
such an employment qualification, regardless of whether a statistical correlation could be established.
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tion decisions has a discriminatory impact even if the class of
which he is a member has not been disproportionately denied
promotion).
We conclude that it is just as much discrimination "because
of . . . sex" to pay a woman lower benefits when she has
made the same contributions as a man as it is to make her pay
larger contributions to obtain the same benefits.
III
Since petitioners plainly would have violated Title VII if
they had run the entire deferred compensation plan themselves, the only remaining question as to liability is whether
their conduct is beyond the reach of the statute because it is
the companies chosen by petitioners to participate in the plan
that calculate and pay the retirement benefits.
Title VII "primarily govern[s] relations between employees and their employer, not between employees and third
parties." 16 Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718, n. 33. Recognizing
this limitation on the reach of the statute, we noted in
Manhart that
"Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful
for an employer to set aside equal retirement contribuThere is no support in either logic or experience for the view, referred to
by JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 4, that an annuity plan must classify on the
basis of sex to be actuarially sound. Neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay
Act "makes it unlawful to determine the funding requirements for an
establishment's benefit plan by considering the [sexual] composition of the
entire force," Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718, n. 34, and it is simply not necessary either to exact greater contributions from women than from men or to
pay women lower benefits than men. For example, the Minnesota Mutual
Life Insurance Company and the Northwestern National Life Insurance
Company have offered an annuity plan that treats men and women equally.
See The Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 25, No. 7, Oct. 13, 1982, at
2~26.
16
The statute applies to employers and "any agent" of an employer.
U. S. C. § 2000e(b).

42
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tions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the
largest benefits which his or her accumulated contributions could command in the open market." I d., at
717-718 (footnote omitted).
Relying on this caveat, petitioners contend that they have
not violated Title VII because the life annuities offered by
the companies participating in the Arizona plan reflect what
is available in the open market. Petitioners cite a statement
in the stipulation of facts entered into in the District Court
that "[a]ll tables presently in use provide larger sum to a
male than to a female of equal age, account value and any
guaranteed payment period." App. 10. 17

a

Petitioners also emphasize that an employee participating in the Arizona plan can elect to receive a lump-sum payment upon retirement and
then "purchase the largest benefits which his or her accumulated contributions could command in the open market." The fact that the lump-sum option permits this has no bearing, however, on whether petitioners have discriminated because of sex in offering an annuity option to its employees.
As we have pointed out above, ante, at note 10, it is no defense to discrimination in the provision of a fringe benefit that another fringe benefit is
provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Although petititioners contended in the Court of Appeals that their conduct was exempted from the reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C.§ 1011 et seq., they have made no
mention of the Act in either their petition for certiorari or their brief on the
merits. "[O]nly in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not
raised in the petition," Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976); see
Sup. Ct. R. 21(a), and but for the discussion of the question by JUSTICE
POWELL we would have seen no reason to address a contention that petitioners deliberately chose to abandon after it was rejected by the Court of
Appeals.
Since JUSTICE POWELL relies on the Act, however, post, at fr-7, we think
it is appropriate to lay the matter to rest. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance." 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b). Although there are no reported Arizona cases indicating the effect of the Arizona statute cited by
17
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It is no defense that all annuities immediately available in
the open market may have been based on sex-segregated actuarial tables. In context it is reasonably clear that the
stipulation on which petitioners rely means only that all the
tables used by the companies taking part in the Arizona plan
are based on sex, 18 but our conclusion does not depend upon
on classifications based on sex in annuity policies, we
may assume that the statute would permit such classifications, for that assumption does not affect our conclusion that the application of Title VII in
this case does not supercede the application of any state law regulating
"the business of insurance." As the Court of Appeals explained, 671 F.
2d, at 333, the plaintiffs in this case have not challenged the conduct of the
business of insurance. No insurance company has been joined as a defendant, and our judgment will in no way preclude any insurance company from
offering annuity benefits that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated
actuarial tables. All that is at issue in this case is an employment prac·
tice: the practice of offering a male employee the opportunity to obtain
greater monthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a similarly situated female employee. It is this conduct of the employer that is prohibited
by Title VII. By its own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only
to the business of insurance and has no application to employment practices. Arizona plainly is not itself involved in the business of insurance,
since it has not underwritten any risks. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, --U.S. - - , - - (1982) (McCarran-Ferguson Act was "intended primarily to protect 'intra-industry cooperation' in the underwriting or risks") (emphasis in original), quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co.
v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 221 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 69 (1959) ("the concept of 'insurance' [for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act] involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company"). Because the application of Title VII in
this case does not supercede any state law governing the business of insurance, see Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F. 2d, at 1064;
EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (N.D. Ohio 1981),
we need not decide whether Title VII "specifically relates to the business
of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Cf.
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp., at
302-306.
18
This is the natural reading of the statement, since it appears in the
portion of the stipulation discussing the options offered by the companies
participating in the State's plan.

JUSTICE POWELL
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whether petitioner's construction of the stipulation is accepted or rejected. It is irrelevant whether any other insurers offered annuities on a sex-neutral basis, since the State
did not simply set aside retirement contributions and let employees purchase annuities on the open market. On the contrary, the State provided the opportunity to obtain an annuity as part of its own deferred compensation plan. It invited
insurance companies to submit bids outlining the terms on
which they would supply retirement benefits 19 and selected
the companies that were permitted to participate in the plan.
Once the State selected these companies, it entered into contracts with them governing the terms on which benefits were
to be provided to employees. Employees enrolling in the
plan could obtain retirement benefits only from one of those
companies, and no employee could be contacted by a company
except as permitted by the State. Ariz. Regs. 2-9-06.A,
2-9-20.A.
Under these circumstances there can be no serious question that petitioners are legally responsible for the discriminatory terms on which annuities are offered by the companies
chosen to participate in the plan. Having created a plan
whereby employees can obtain the advantages of using deferred compensation to purchase an annuity only if they invest in one of the companies specifically selected by the
State, the State cannot disclaim responsibility for the discriminatory features of the insurers' options. 20 Since employers are ultimately responsible for the "compensation,
terms, conditions, [and] privileges of employment" provided
to employees, an employer that adopts a fringe-benefit
9
' The State's contract procurement documents asked the bidders to
quote annuity rates for men and women.
20
See Peters v. Wayne State University, supra, 691 F. 2d, at 238; EEOC
v. Colby College, supra, at 1141; Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or
Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the
Manhart Case, 64 AAUP Bulletin 150, 152-155 (1978).
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scheme that discriminates among its employees on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII regardless of whether third parties are also involved in the discrimination. 21 In this case the State of Arizona was itself a
party to contracts concerning the annuities to be offered by
the insurance companies, and it is well established that both
parties to a discriminatory contract are liable for any discriminatory provisions the contract contains, regardless of
which party initially suggested inclusion of the discriminatory provisions. 22 It would be inconsistent with the broad re21
An analogy may usefully be drawn to our decision in Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB, 441 U. S. 488 (1979). The employer in that case provided in-plant
food services to its employees under a contract with an independent caterer. We held that the prices charged for the food constituted "terms
and conditions of employment" under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and were therefore mandatory subjects for collective bargaining.
We specifically rejected the employer's argument that, because the food
was provided by a third party, the prices did not implicate "'an aspect of
the relationship between the employer and employees.'" I d., at 501,
quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co .,
404 U. S. 157, 176 (1971). We emphasized that the selection of an independent contractor to provide the food did not change the fact that "the
matter of in-plant food prices and services is an aspect of the relationship
between Ford and its own employees." 441 U. S., at 501.
Just as the issue in Ford was whether the employer had refused to bargain with respect to "terms and conditions of employment," 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(d), the issue here is whether petitioners have discriminated against
female employees with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Even more so than in-plant food prices, retirement benefits are matters "of deep concern" to employees, id., at 498, and
plainly constitute an aspect of the employment relationship. Indeed, in
Ford we specifically compared in-plant food services to "other kinds of
benefits, such as health insurance, implicating outside suppliers." Id., at
503, n. 15. We do not think it makes any more difference here than it did
in Ford that the employer engaged third parties to provide a particular
benefit rather than directly providing the benefit itself.
22
See Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 673 F. 2d 742, 750-751
(CA5 1982), cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1983); Williams v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 665 F. 2d 918, 926 (CA9), mod. and reh. denied, 28 Fair
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medial purposes of Title VII 23 to hold that an employer who
adopts a discriminatory fringe benefit plan can avoid liability
on the ground that he could not find a third party willing to
treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory basis. 24 An employer who confronts such a situation must either supply the
fringe benefit himself, without the assistance of any third
party, or not provide it at all.

IV
We turn finally to the relief awarded by the District Court.
The court enjoined petitioners to assure that future annuity
payments to retired female employees shall be equal to the
payments received by similarly situated male employees. 25
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 4~2 U. S. 405 (1975),
we emphasized that one of the main purposes of Title VII is
"to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Id., at 418. We recogEmp. Cas. 1820, cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1982); Farmer v. ARA
Services, Inc., 660 F. 2d 1096, 1104 (CA6 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 635 F. 2d 1007, 1014 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 940 (1981);
United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379-380 (CA81973);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791, 799 (CA4), cert. dismissed, 404
u. s. 1006 (1971).
23
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418, 421
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S., at 429-430.
24
Such a result would be particularly anomalous where, as here, the employer made no effort to determine whether third parties would provide
the benefit on a neutral basis. Contrast The Chronicle of Higher Education, note 15, supra, at 25-26 (explaining how the University of Minnesota
obtained agreements from two insurance companies to use sex-neutral annuity tables to calculate annuity benefits for its employees). Far from
bargaining for sex-neutral treatment of its employees, Arizona asked companies seeking to participate in its plan to list their annuity rates for men
and women separately.
25
The court did not explain its reasons for choosing this remedy.
1
Since respondents did not appeal the District Court's refusal to award
damages for benefit payments made prior to the court's decision, see n. 5,
supra, there is no need to consider the correctness of that ruling.
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nized that there is a strong presumption that "[t]he injured
party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he
would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed."
Id., at 418-419, quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 99
(1867). Once a violation of the statute has been found, retroactive relief "should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination." 422 U. S., at 421 (footnote omitted).
Applying this standard, we held that the mere absence of bad
faith on the part of the employer is not a sufficient reason for
denying such relief. I d., at 422-423.
Although this Court noted in Manhart that "[t]he Albemarle presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom
be overcome," 435 U. S., at 719, the Court concluded that
under the circumstances the District Court had abused its
discretion in requiring the employer to refund to female employees all contributions they were required to make in excess of the contributions demanded of men. The Court explained that "conscientious and intelligent administrators of
pension funds, who did not have the benefit of the extensive
briefs and arguments presented to us, may well have assumed that a program like the Department's was entirely
lawful," since "[t]he courts had been silent on the question,
and the administrative agencies had conflicting views." I d.,
at 720 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that retroactive relief based on "[d]rastic changes in the legal rules
governing pension and insurance funds" can "jeopardiz[e] the
insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insureds' benefits,"
id., at 721, and that the burden of such relief can fall on innocent third parties. I d., at 722-723.
While the relief ordered here affects only benefit payments
made after the date of the District Court's judgment, it does
not follow that the relief is wholly prospective in nature, as
an injunction concerning future conduct ordinarily is, and
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should therefore be routinely awarded once liability is established. When a court directs a change in benefits based on
contributions made before the court's order, the court is
awarding relief that is fundamentally retroactive in nature.
This is true because retirement benefits under a plan such as
that at issue here represent a return on contributions which
were made during the employee's working years and which
were intended to fund the benefits without any additional
contributions from any source after retirement.
A recognition that the relief awarded by the District Court
is partly retroactive is only the beginning of the inquiry.
Absent special circumstances a victim of a Title VII violation
is entitled to whatever retroactive relief is necessary to undo
any damage resulting from the violation. See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 418-419, 421. As to any
disparity in benefits that is attributable to contributions
made after our decision in Manhart, there are no special circumstances justifying the denial of retroactive relief. Our
1 ruling today was clearly foreshadowed by Manhart. That
decision should have put petitioners on notice that a man and
a woman who make the same contributions to a retirement
plan must be paid the same monthly benefits. 26 To the ex-

I

26
Only one of the several lower court decisions since Manhart has accepted the argument that the principle established in that decision is limited to plans that require women to make greater contributions than men,
see n. 9, supra, and no court has held that an employer can assert as a defense that the calculation and payment of retirement benefits is made by
third parties selected by the employer. See also Van Alstyne, supra, 64
AA UP Bulletin, at 152-155 (predicting that the the involvement of an independent insurer would not be recognized as a defense and noting that an
employer offering a sex-based retirement plan funded by such an insurer
would be well advised to act expeditiously to bring himself into compliance
with the law). After Manhart an employer could not reasonably have assumed that a sex-based plan would be lawful. As explained above, supra,
at 12-13, Arizona did not simply set aside wages and permit employees to
purchase annuities in the open market; it therefore had no basis for assuming that the open-market exception recognized in Manhart would apply to
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tent that any disparity in benefits coming due after the date
of the District Court's judgment is attributable to contributions made after Manhart, there is therefore no unfairness in
requiring petitioners to pay retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each month to bring them up to the
benefit level that they would have enjoyed had their postM anhart contributions been treated in the same way as those
of similarly situated male employees.
To the extent, however, that the disparity in benefits that
the District Court required petitioners to eliminate is attributable to contributions made before Manhart, the court gave
insufficient attention to this Court's recognition in Manhart
that until that decision the use of sex-based tables might reasonably have been assumed to be lawful. Insofar as this portion of the disparity is concerned, the District Court should
have inquired into the circumstances in which petitioners,
after Manhart, could have applied sex-neutral tables to the
pre-Manhart contributions of a female employee and a similarly situated male employee without violating any contractual rights that the latter might have had on the basis of his
pre-Manhart contributions. If, in the case of a particular female employee and a similarly situated male employee, petitioners could have applied sex-neutral tables to pre-Manhart
contributions without violating any contractual right of the
male employee, they should have done so in order to prevent
further discrimination in the payment of retirement benefits
in the wake of this Court's ruling in Manhart. 27 Since a feits plan.
27
Since the actual calculation and payment of retirement benefits was in
the hands of third parties under the Arizona plan, petitioners would not
automatically have been able to apply sex-neutral tables to pre-Manhart
contributions even if pre-existing contractual rights posed no obstacle.
However, petitioners were in a position to exert influence on the companies participating in the plan, which depended upon the State for the business generated by the deferred compensation plan, and we see no reason
why petitioners should stand in a better position because they engaged
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male employee in this situation should have had sex-neutral
tables applied to her pre-Manhart contributions, it is only
fair that petitioners be required to supplement any benefits
coming due after the District Court's judgment by whatever
sum is necessary to compensate her for their failure to adopt
sex-neutral tables.
If, on the other hand, sex-neutral tables could not have
been applied to the pre-Manhart contributions of a particular
female employee and any similarly situated male employee
without violating the male employee's contractual rights, it
would be inequitable to award such relief. To do so would be
to require petitioners to compensate the female employee for
a disparity attributable to pre-Manhart conduct even though
such conduct might reasonably have been assumed to be lawful and petitioners could not have done anything after
Manhart to eliminate that disparity short of expending State
funds. With respect to any female employee determined to
fall in this category, petitioners need only ensure that her
monthly benefits are no lower than they would have been had
her post-Manhart contributions been treated in the same
way as those of a similarly situated male employee.
The record does not indicate whether some or all of the
male participants in the plan who had not retired at the time
Manhart was decided 28 had any contractual right to a particular level of benefits that would have been impaired by the
application of sex-neutral tables to their pre-Manhart contributions. The District Court should address this question
on remand.

)

third parties to pay the benefits than they would be in had they run the
entire plan themselves.
28
Since the amount of monthly annuity payments is ordinarily fixed by
the time of retirement, sex-neutral tables presumably could not have been
applied after Manhart to male employees who had retired before that decision without violating their contractual rights.
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent
class consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the
plan or will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was
granted to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., prohibits an
employer from offering its employees the option of receiving
retirement benefits from one of several companies selected
by the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the relief awarded by the District Court was proper. The Court holds that this practice
does constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation
of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits derived from
contributions made after the decision today must be calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary. This position is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of JusTICE MARSHALL, post, p. - - , which are joined by JUSTICE
BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR.
The Court further holds that benefits derived
from contributions made prior to this decision may be calcu-
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lated as provided by the existing terms of the Arizona plan.
This position is expressed in Part III of the opinion of JusTICE POWELL, post, p. - - , which is joined by THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent
class consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the
plan or will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was
granted to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. §2000e et seq., prohibits an
employer from offering its employees the option of receiving
retirement benefits from one of several companies selected
by the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the relief awarded by the District Court was proper. The Court holds that this practice
does constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation
of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits derived from
contributions made after the decision today must be calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary. This position is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of JusTICE MARSHALL, post, p. - - , which are joined by JUSTICE
BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR.
The Court further holds that benefits derived
from contributions made prior to this decision may be calcu-
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lated as provided by the existing terms of the Arizona plan.
This position is expressed in Part III of the opinion of JusTICE POWELL, post, p. - -, which is joined by THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment August 1,
1983.

It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAiES. cillat~a: - - - No. 82-52

ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DEFERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[July 6, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join as to Parts I
and II, dissenting in part and with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join as to Part III, concurring in part.
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its
employees life annuities from a private insurance company
that uses actuarially sound, sex-based mortality tables.
This holding will have a far-reaching effect on the operation
of insurance and pension plans. Employers may be forced to
discontinue offering life annuities, or potentially disruptive
changes may be required in long-established methods of calculating insurance and pensions. 1 Either course will work a
' The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive.
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years.
United States Department of Labor, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 (1983) (hereinafter Department of
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers will be
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption
may be unfounded. If employers are required to "top up" benefits-i. e.,
calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable w men rather than apply a
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major change in the way the cost of insurance is determined-to the probable detriment of all employees. This is
contrary to our explicit recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U~ S. 702, 717 (1978), that
Title VII "was [not] intended to revolutionize the insurance
and pension industries."
J o"" iS~; • .J
I

The State of Arizona provides its employees with a voluntary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a portion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the employee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires,
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life
annuity.
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates
between men and women when an employee contributes to
the fund. The plan is voluntary and each employee may contribute as much as he or she chooses. ·Nor does anyone contend that either of the first two methods of repaying the accrued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dispute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The
first two options, however, have disadvantages. If an emunisex rate to both men and women-the cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to $676 million each year for at least
the next 15 years. Department of Labor Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be passed on-in large part-to the
annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of state and local governments, to the
public.
0 ""is~ i
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ployee chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability
will be substantial. 2 The second option ameliorates the tax
problem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over
a fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard
against the possibility that the finite number of payments selected by the employee will fail to provide income for the remainder of his or her life.
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liability by spreading the payments out over time, and it guarantees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 3~71(C)(1) (1983). But to achieve tax benefits under federallaw, the life annuity must be purchased from a company
designated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193. Accordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance companies to make life annuities available to its employees. The
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast
majority of private insurance companies in the United States,
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Arizona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase
on the open market.
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates
Title VII. In the majority's view, Title VII requires an employer to follow one of three courses. An employer must
provide unisex annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide such annuities, or provide no annuities to
its employees. Ante, at 17 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The first option is largely illusory. Most employers do not have either the financial re2
The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as
income. See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193.
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sources or administrative ability to underwrite annuities.
Or, as in this case, state law may prevent an employer from
providing annuities. If unisex annuities are available, an
employer may contract with private insurance companies to
provide them. It is stipulated, however, that the insurance
companies with which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The insurance industry either is prevented by
state law from doing so 3 or it views unisex mortality tables
as actuarially unsound. An employer, of course, may choose
the third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving. It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled
choice.
II

As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's holding are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carriers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be denied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 4 If, alternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer
these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits
3
See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(f) (West) (1983) (requiring differentials based on the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that
State of New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates).
• This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liability resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona discontinued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect oftoday's holding apparently will fall primarily on the State's employees.

I

o~i '- ~~It W

82-52-CONCUR & DISSENT
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE v. NORRIS

5

probably will be passed on to current employees. There is
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping reading of this statute. That case expressly recognized the limited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legislative history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's
policies to the insurance industry.

A
We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the question before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was limited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice violated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries." Ibid.
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insurance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the respective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33,
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 5 This Act reflects the
When this Court held for the first time that the federal government
had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944) (holding the antitrust laws applicable to the business of insurance), Congress responded by
passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq.
As initially proposed, the Act had a narrow focus. It would have provided
only: "That nothing contained in the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, or the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, shall be construed to apply to the business of
insurance or to acts in the conduct of that business or in any wise impair
the regulation of that business by the several States." S. Rep. No. 1112,
5
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long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent
policy of entrusting insurance regulation to the States, the
majority is not justified in assuming that Congress intended
in 1964 to require the industry to change long-standing actuarial methods, approved over decades by state insurance
commissions. 6
Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this pre78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944) (quoting proposed act). This narrow version, however, was not accepted.
Congress subsequently proposed and adopted a much broader bill. It
recognized, as it previously had, the need to accomodate federal antitrust
laws and state regulation of insurance. See H. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3 (1945). But it also recognized that the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters Association had raised questions as to the general validity of state laws governing the business of insurance. Some insurance carriers were reluctant to comply with state regulatory authority, fearing
liability for their actions. See id., at 2. Congress thus enacted broad legislation "so that the several States may know that the Congress desires to
protect the continued regulation . . . of the business of insurance by the
several States." Ibid.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, as adopted, accordingly commits the regulation of the insurance industry presumptively to the States. The introduction to the Act provides that "silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the]
business [of insurance] by the several States." 15 U. S. C. § 1011. Section 2(b) of the Act further provides: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance." 29 U. S. C. § 1012(b).
6
Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities explicitly proscribe
"unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey, Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). Arizona insurance law similarly
provides that there shall be "no unfair discrimination between individuals
of the same class." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-448 (1983). Most States,
including Arizona, have determined that the use of actuarially sound, sexbased mortality tables comports with this state definition of discrimination.
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emption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the majority identified any evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to
be discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous
Given the provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends
to supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that "specifically relate to the business of insurance," see n. 5, supra, the majority
offers no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress intended Title
VII to pre-empt this important area of state regulation.
The majority states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their brief. See ante, at
- - , n. 17 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This misses the point. The question presented is whether Congress intended Title VII to prevent employers from offering their employees-pursuant to state law-actuarially sound, sex-based annuitites.
The
McCarran-Ferguson Act is explicitly relevant to determining congressional
intent. It provides that courts should not presume that Congress intended to supersede state regulation of insurance unless the act in question
"specifically relates to the business of insurance." See n. 5, supra. It
therefore is necessary to consider the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in determining Congress' intent in Title VII. This presents two
questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII involves the "business of insurance" and whether the application of Title VII would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law.
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be spread
among classes of insureds is an integral part of the "business of insurance."
See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 213
(1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S. 65, 73 (1959). The majority argues, nevertheless, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite
because Title VII will not supersede any state regulation. Because Title
VII applies to employers rather than insurance carriers, the majority asserts that its view of Title VII will not affect the business of insurance.
See ante, at--, n. 17 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). This formalistic distinction ignores self-evident facts. State insurance laws, such as Arizona's, allow employers to purchase sex-based annuities for their employees. Title VII, as the majority interprets it, would
prohibit employers from purchasing such annuities for their employees. It
begs reality to say that a federal law that thus denies the right to do what
state insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state
law. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S., at 67. The majority's
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grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdiction to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history indicates precisely the opposite.
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Senate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and
women under industrial benefit plans. 7 See 110 Cong. Rec.
13663-13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "[alt]hough he did not address differences in employee contributions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed
that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing
interpretation of Title VII-to the extent it banned the sale of actuarially
sound, sex-based annuities-effectively would pre-empt state regulatory
authority. In my view, the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are
directly relevant to determining Congress' intent in enacting Title VII.
7
Senator Humphrey's statement was based on the adoption of the Bennett amendment, which incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal
Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), into Title VII. See County of
Washington, Ore. v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 175, n. 15 (1981). Although
not free from ambiguity, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act provides ample support for Senator Humphrey's interpretation of that Act.
In explaining the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses, the Senate Report
on that statute noted that pension costs were "higher for women than men
. . . because of the longer life span of women." S. Rep. No. 176, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1963). It then explained that the question of additional costs associated with employing women was one "that can only be
answered by an ad hoc investigation." Ibid. Thus, it concluded that
where it could be shown that there were in fact higher costs for women
than men, an exception to the Equal Pay Act could be permitted "similar to
those ... for a bona fide seniority system or other exception noted above."
Ibid .
Even if other meanings might be drawn from the Equal Pay Act's legislative history, the crucial question is how Congress viewed the Equal Pay
The only relevant legAct in 1964 when it incorporated it into Title VII.
islative history that exists on this point demonstrates unmistakably that
Congress perceived-with good reason-that "the 1964 Act [Title VII]
would have little, if any, impact on existing pension plans." Manhart, 435
U. S., at 714.
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pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Senator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance
industry.
B
As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative
history supports its holding, the majority is compelled to rely
on its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The
policy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in employment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifically on the individual and "precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Insurance and life annuities exist because it is impossible to
measure accurately how long any one individual will live.
Insurance companies cannot make individual determinations
of life expectancy; they must consider instead the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a sufficiently large group
of people, an insurance company can predict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of deaths within the
group based on the past mortality experience of similar
groups. Title VII's concern for effect of employment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplicable to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing insurance
and annuities.

c

The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus
requires that an insurance company group individuals according to attributes that have a significant correlation with mor-
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tality. The most accurate classification system would be to
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be prohibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of longevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable.
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982).
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classification-that the majority ultimately condemns. See ante, at
8-10 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The policies underlying Title VII, rather than supporting the majority's decision, strongly suggest-at least for
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was enacted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of
Title VII is directed against discriminationr-disparate
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or arbitrarily affects an individual. But as JusTICE BLACKMUN
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is nothing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recognizing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans."
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications,
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not automatically invalid. 8 Sex-based mortality tables reflect objec- '
tive actuarial experience. Because their use does not entail
Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications, and there
is no reason for assuming that Congress intended to do so in this instance.
8
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discrimination in any normal understanding of that term, 9 a
court should hesitate to invalidate this long-approved practice on the basis of its own policy judgment.
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classifications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended
to do so in Title VII. And certainly the policy underlying
Title VII provides no warrant for extending the reach of the
statute beyond Congress' intent.
III
The District Court held that Arizona's voluntary pension
plan violates Title VII and ordered that future annuity payments to female retirees be made equal to payments received
by similarly situated men. 10 486 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz.
1980). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
671 F. 2d 330 (1982). The Court today affirms the Court of
Appeals' judgment insofar as it holds that Arizona's voluntary pension plan violates Title VII. But this finding of a
statutory violation provides no basis for approving the retroactive relief awarded by the District Court. To approve this
award would be both unprecedented and manifestly unjust.
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief is normally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded
that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding
such relief. 435 U. S., at 719. As we noted, the employer
Seen. 7, supra.
9
Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on
unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits
than similarly situated women.
10
As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes, the relief awarded by the District Court
is fundamentally retroactive in nature. See ante, at 19 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Annuity payments are funded by the
employee's past contributions and represent a return on those contributions. In order to provide women with the higher level of periodic payments ordered by the District Court, the State of Arizona would be required to fund retroactively the deficiency in past contributions made by its
women retirees.
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in Manhart may well have assumed that its pension program
was lawful. !d., at 720. More importantly, a retroactive
remedy would have had a potentially disruptive impact on
the operation of the employer's pension plan. The business
of underwriting insurance and life annuities requires careful
approximation of risk. I d., at 721. Reserves normally are
sufficient to cover only the cost of funding and administering
the plan. Should an unforeseen contigency occur, such as a
drastic change in the legal rules governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's solvency and the insured's
benefits could be jeopardized. Ibid.
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly confirmed that an employer could set aside equal contributions
and let each retiree purchase whatever benefit his or her contributions could command on the "open market," id., at 718.
Given this explicit limitation, an employer reasonably could
have assumed that it would be lawful to make available to its
employees annuities offered by insurance companies on the
open market.
As in Manhart, holding employers liable retroactively
would have devasting results. The holding applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost of complying
with the District Court's award of retroactive relief would
range from $817 to $1260 million annually for the next 15 to
30 years. 11 Department of Labor Cost Study 32. In this
The cost to employers of equalizing benefits varies according to three
factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a defined-benefit
plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or prospectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between men
and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top up
women's benefits. The figures in text assume, as the District Court appeared to hold, see 486 F. Supp. 645, 652, that employers would be required to top up women's benefits.
11
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case, the cost would fall on the State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local governments also would be affected
directly by today's decision. Imposing such unanticipated financial burdens would come at a time when many States and
local governments are struggling to meet substantial fiscal
deficits. Income, excise and property taxes are being increased. There is no justification for this Court, particularly
in view of the question left open in Manhart, to impose this
magnitude of burden retroactively on the public. Accordingly, liability should be prospective only. 12

12
In this respect, I agree with JusTICE O'CONNOR that only benefits derived from contributions collected after the effective date of the judgment
need be calculated without regard to the sex of the employee. See ante, at
-(O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
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